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2Abstract
Because of its importance to determining drug usage, information has always been an important part of
the regulation of prescription drugs. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the pharmaceutical
industry are in a continuous battle over the dissemination of product information. This paper focuses on
one of the battlegrounds on the speech issue, industry sponsorship of continuing medical education (CME).
The FDA’s guidance on regulating industry-sponsored CME bans speech about oﬀ-label uses at CME and
requires that other speech presented be truthful, non-misleading and fairly balanced. This guidance raises
First Amendment issues, in particular because the speech presented at CME, although arguably commercial
speech, appears at ﬁrst glance to be core scientiﬁc speech meriting the highest constitutional protection. This
paper ﬁrst provides a background on the FDA’s regulatory authority over promotional activities, looking at
the FDA’s authority to approve drugs, to declare drugs misbranded due to lack of adequate directions for use,
and to regulate the labeling and advertising of drugs. Next, it discusses the Washington Legal Foundation
cases, brought to challenge the CME guidance as an unconstitutional restriction on speech because it bans
speech about oﬀ-label uses. It examines the district court’s holdings that industry-sponsored CME speech is
commercial speech, and that the regulation is an unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech because
it is considerably more extensive than necessary to further the government’s interest in getting new uses
on-label. Lastly, it examines the problem of representational speech that arises when speech is tied to
ﬁnancial sponsorship, which is that the speech of the funded speaker cannot always be attributed to the
ﬁnancial sponsor. It ﬁnds that the guidance factors fail to establish a representative connection between
the CME speaker and the pharmaceutical manufacturer necessary to hold the pharmaceutical manufacturer
responsible for the speaker’s speech. Therefore, the CME guidance sweeps into its regulatory scheme not
only commercial speech, but also core speech that deserves the highest First Amendment protection.
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6I. Introduction
It is after all, only within a particular information context that a drug really exists.
Without all of the information on the indications, dosage, and proper use contained
in the labeling, coupled with the information and knowledge physicians possess about
the use of drugs from their training and experience, a drug is not, in any practical
sense, a drug. It’s just a useless and probably dangerous chemical. But with the right
information, a drug can be a therapeutic tool of enormous and often lifesaving value
to patients.1
Because of its importance, drug information is the focus of many struggles between the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the pharmaceutical industry. Who may provide this information and who may
receive it are questions constantly being debated in the area of drug law. While commentators on all sides
seem to agree that a free ﬂow of accurate information is ideal, the FDA remains suspicious of allowing
pharmaceutical manufacturers, who have an interest in casting their own products in a favorable light and
thereby increasing sales, to provide this information.
The FDA has traditionally monitored manufacturer advertising to doctors who – as the prescribers of drugs
– are arguably the most important recipients of this information. But while the FDA has jurisdiction over
the pharmaceutical industry, it does not over the medical profession2 and thus claims not to interfere with
the exchange of purely scientiﬁc information between pharmaceutical manufacturers and doctors.3 But in
recent years, the FDA has expanded its jurisdiction to reach forms of speech outside of the traditionally reg-
ulated areas of labeling and advertising; among the recent expansions was the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction
over pharmaceutical industry-sponsored continuing medical education seminars and symposia (collectively
2See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2000) (stating that the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) “[shall not] be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for
any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”).
3See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997)
[hereinafter Final CME Guidance] (noting that “FDA traditionally has not sough to regulate industry-supported scientiﬁc and
educational activities that are otherwise independent and non-promotional.”). In addition, the FDA does not typically interfere
with exchanges of information between physicians and the research departments of pharmaceutical manufacturers – for example,
requests for information from physicians to manufacturers.
7“CME”)4 in its “Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Activities.”5 This document
declared the FDA’s intention to subject CME seminars that it found were not independent of a pharmaceu-
tical sponsor (a determination that FDA would make based on 12 factors of independence) to its regulations
governing labeling and advertising.6 Notably, the eﬀect of regulation would be to prevent any discussion of
oﬀ-label uses7 and to require that all other speech about products be truthful, non-misleading and provide
a fair balance of information.8
The rules set out in the guidance were challenged in a suit brought by the Washington Legal Foundation
(WLF), a free speech public interest group claiming to represent member physicians’ interests in receiving
the information, which alleged that this guidance, plus a separate guidance on distribution of reprints of
scientiﬁc articles and textbook excerpts,9 created a restriction on speech about oﬀ-label uses unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.10 In its decision on the merits of the constitutional issue in Washington Legal
4The AMA deﬁnes CME as “educational activities that serve to maintain, develop, or increase the knowledge, skills, and
professional performance and relationships a physician uses to provide services for patients, the public, or the profession.”
See The AMA Deﬁnition of CME, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2937.html (last visited April 15,
2003).
562 Fed. Reg. 64,074.
6See id. The guidance document does not have a legal independent eﬀect, but does “describe the agency’s interpretation of
or policy on a regulatory issue...
...Guidance documents include, but are not limited to, documents that relate to: The design, production, labeling, promotion,
manufacturing, and testing of regulated products; the processing, content, and evaluation or approval of submissions; and
inspection and enforcement policies.
...Guidance documents do not include: Documents relating to internal FDA procedures, agency reports, general information
documents provided to consumers or health professionals, speeches, journal articles and editorials, media interviews, press
materials, warning letters, memoranda of understanding, or other communications directed to individual persons or ﬁrms.”
21 C.F.R. § 10.115(a)(1)-(3). “Although guidance documents do not legally bind FDA, they represent the agency’s current
thinking. Therefore, FDA employees may depart from guidance documents only with appropriate justiﬁcation and supervisory
concurrence.” 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(d)(3).
7See Draft Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Education Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,412, 56,412 (Nov.
27, 1992) [hereinafter Draft CME Guidance]. Oﬀ-label uses are uses the FDA has not reviewed and approved for its label and
therefore have not received a rigorous review by the agency as to the safety and eﬃcacy for this use. See Steven R. Salbu,
Oﬀ-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51
Fla. L. Rev. 181, 187-88 (1999) (deﬁning oﬀ-label use). They are also termed “unapproved,” “unlabeled,” or “extra-label”
uses. See Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration’s Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Uses of Approved
Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,820 (Nov. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Request for Comment
on Citizen Petition].
8See id. at 57,412 at note 1.
9See Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published, Original Data, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct.
8, 1996); Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8, 1996).
10The court ﬁrst considered the suit in Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1995) (denying FDA’s
motion to dismiss). The court ﬁnally reached the merits of the case in Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp.
2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998) [hereinafter WLF I], amended, 36 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), 56 F. Supp.2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999), appeal
8Foundation v. Friedman (WLF I), the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia ruled the guid-
ance, insofar as it banned speech about oﬀ-label uses by pharmaceutical manufacturers, unconstitutional.11
While this speech was commercial speech, the court found, the restriction was not narrowly tailored to meet
the government’s interest in encouraging companies to apply for new drug indications.12
Despite this initial loss, the FDA’s position still remains at odds with the court’s view of CME speech. On
appeal, the FDA reversed its position that the guidance set forth its enforcement authority, claiming instead
that it merely established a safe harbor for promotional CME that the FDA would not regulate.13 Finding
no constitutional question remaining, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s holdings, though it did
not reach the merits of the case.14 Following the decision, the FDA maintained that the “CME guidance
document details how the agency intends to exercise its enforcement discretion”15 only acknowledging that,
“if the agency brings an enforcement action, a manufacturer may raise a First Amendment defense.”16 This
continued policy was upheld against a ﬁnal challenge by the WLF back in the district court.17 The District
Court conﬁrmed that the Appeals Court decision had vacated the entire injunction it had ordered in WLF
I.18 This leaves pharmaceutical companies back where they started; although the only court to pass on the
merits of the case found the guidance unconstitutional, the procedural disposition of the case still has not
freed pharmaceutical companies to engage in this type of speech.
There are still important unsettled issues regarding the FDA’s regulation of CME. WLF I was only the ﬁrst
dismissed, judgment vacated in part, Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) [hereinafter WLF
II] (ﬁnding no constitutional question after FDA proposed guidance document to be merely a “safe harbor”), remanded 128 F.
Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter WLF III].
11See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51.
12See id. at 73.
13See WLF II, 202 F.3d 331.
14See id.
15Notice; Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter WLF II
Notice] (notifying the regulated community how the court’s recent decision in WLF II will aﬀect the FDA’s enforcement policy
on CME).
16Id.
17WLF III, 128 F. Supp. 2d 11.
18Id.
9of a series of important court cases that have struck down FDA attempts to regulate speech, suggesting a
turning point in the courts’ view on speech in the area of drug regulation.19 Far from supporting the FDA’s
regulation of modern pharmaceutical promotion, courts have looked disapprovingly on the FDA’s aggressive
approach, even stating that “FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe.”20 The stance taken by the
courts was so contrary to the FDA’s approach to the First Amendment that it caused the FDA to reassess
its First Amendment policies. In May of 2002, the FDA asked for comments in order to reassess its First
Amendment policy.21 In its request, FDA recognized that “there may be tension between some aspects of
FDA’s authority and judicial developments” 22:
The Supreme Court has increasingly recognized the value of speech proposing a commercial transac-
tion, which it calls commercial speech and which is entitled to First Amendment protection so long
as it is truthful and not misleading. This case law presents a challenge to FDA. FDA must balance
the need and right of Americans to speak and hear information vital to their every day lives against
the need to ensure that people are not misled....
FDA must continue to pursue regulation of products for purposes of protecting the public with a
full recognition of the evolving judicial landscape in areas that directly aﬀect its ability to regulate
words. To be sure, FDA will continue to regulate commercial speech as part of its mandate. In
particular, FDA intends to defend the act against any constitutional challenges, as it did in the
Western States case. FDA seeks to ensure, however, that its regulations, guidances, policies, and
practices comply with the First Amendment. FDA also wishes to learn what empirical evidence
exists concerning the eﬀect of commercial speech on the public health, and whether its regulations
in this ﬁeld in fact advance public health.23
19Other recent signiﬁcant cases include Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the FDA’s regulation
of health claims on dietary supplement labeling was an unconstitutional regulation of speech) and Thompson v. Western States
Med. Ctr, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (holding that the FDA’s ban on pharmacies’ advertising of compounding was an unconstitutional
regulation of speech). In addition, First Amendment scholars have found that we are now generally in a period of increasing
recognition of new First Amendment rights. “[One explanation] for the emerging salience of [First Amendment] challenges ...is
the recognition of new forms of First Amendment claims: rights to receive information; rights not to speak; rights of corporations
and organizations to speak; rights to speak (or not to speak) that arise out of a message attributed to an individual or group.”
Randall P. Bezanson and William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1377, 1381 (2001).
20Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 67. See also Kessler, 880 F. Supp. at 32-33 (criticizing the FDA’s approach to First
Amendment issues: “[T]he FDA’s handling of WLF’s Citizen Petition, as well as the statements in its ﬁlings and at oral
argument, evidence a somewhat less vigilant concern for the doctors’ First Amendment rights than this court would hope to
see.”).
21See Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942 (May 16, 2002) [hereinafter Request for
First Amendment Comment]. Previously, the FDA had taken a “until we are told not to” approach in considering the legal
consequences of its regulation, stating at one point, “how expansive the FDA’s reach is remains an unsettled question...Until
further judicial decisions or congressional action clariﬁes the FDA’s speciﬁc authority in the area of promotion, the FDA will
continue to assert broad jurisdiction.” David A. Kessler and Wayne L. Pines, The Federal Regulation of Prescription Drug
Advertising and Promotion, 264 JAMA 2411 (1990). This stance changed both with the departure of Kessler (known to be a
particularly aggressive Commissioner) and with the decisions in the First Amendment cases mentioned supra, note 19.
22Request for First Amendment Comment, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942.
10More than 750 comments regarding the FDA’s compliance with the First Amendment were ﬁled by the time
the docket closed on October 28, 2002.24
This request for comments on First Amendment compliance could be an opportunity for the FDA to re-
consider its entire approach to scientiﬁc speech, particularly in the CME context. Questions that deserve
consideration include: Are the factors used by the FDA to determine which CME are promotional the proper
ones? Do they comport with current First Amendment jurisprudence? Do they delineate a proper line be-
tween commercial and non-commercial speech that the FDA can use generally for regulation? Part II of this
paper brieﬂy sets out the FDA’s regulatory scheme and how it was used in the CME guidance document.
It also examines the various arguments put forth for and against the regulations. Part III describes WLF
I ’s analysis of the speech issues aﬀected in CME. It examines the court’s two-part holding that ﬁrst, the
CME speech was commercial speech and second, the FDA’s regulation did not meet the test for commercial
speech, and places the case in the context of First Amendment case law. Part IV analyzes the guidance
document and the WLF I decision according to current First Amendment law, taking the position that the
guidance fails to establish a representative connection between the CME speaker and the pharmaceutical
manufacturer necessary to hold the pharmaceutical manufacturer responsible for the speaker’s speech. This
part looks at representative speech theory and case law from other situations where institutions have spon-
sored speech to support this conclusion. It shows that, as a result of the lack of a representative connection
necessary to render the speech promotional, the CME guidance sweeps in speech that is not commercial in
nature, but rather core speech that deserves the highest First Amendment protection.
24See FDA’s First Amendment comment docket, available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0209/02n0209.htm
(last visited March 24, 2003).
11II. The FDA’s asserted authority over CME
With respect to CME, the eﬀect of the FDA’s regulations can be grouped into two major categories: (1)
restrictions on what can be said (i.e. the ban on promoting oﬀ-label uses) and (2) restrictions on how it can
be portrayed (i.e. the requirement for objective treatment in the presentation of uses).
The FDA’s jurisdiction to regulate speech about drugs25 normally derives from
its authority to regulate prescription drug labeling26 and prescription drug adver-
tising.27 In the CME guidance, the FDA also asserted a third basis: regulation
of misbranded drugs based on the lack of adequate directions for their intended
uses.28 The bases asserted shape the form of the FDA’s regulation over speech
and accordingly, over CME.
A. Authority to approve drugs
The FDA’s authority over labeling is closely tied to its authority over drug approvals.29 Before a manufacturer
can distribute a drug in interstate commerce, it must obtain approval from the FDA through a new drug
25For simplicity’s sake, I will discuss only the FDA’s regulation of information about human prescription drugs, though each
of the rules discussed can also generally be applied to animal drugs, biological products and medical devices – therapeutic
products also within the FDA’s jurisdiction.
26The FDA has had authority to regulate labeling since its inception. See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA),
21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2000) (creating the FDA and giving it authority to regulate drug labeling.)
27The FDA was later given authority to regulate prescription drug labeling in the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (Oct. 10, 1962). The jurisdiction over advertising gave the FDA more power in the
prescription drug area than it has in other industries it regulates (food, cosmetics, over-the-counter drugs), as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) assumes jurisdiction over advertising in those industries. See FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding,
36 Fed. Reg. 18,539 (Sept. 16, 1971) (delineating the respective jurisdictional lines between labeling and advertising in the
areas of food, cosmetics, and over-the counter drugs). The authority to regulate both prescription drug labeling and advertising
gives the FDA the most power over this industry.
28See Final CME Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074.
29Both are integral to the fulﬁllment of the FDA’s two general functions under the FDCA: “(1) the review and approval
of important new products that can improve the public health, such as life-saving drugs, biological products, and medical
devices; and (2) the prevention of harm to the public from marketed products that are unsafe or ineﬀective.” Food and Drug
Administration Performance and Accountability Act of 1995, S. Rpt. No. 104-284 (1996) [hereinafter FDA Accountability
Report].
12application (NDA) that demonstrates, through a series of preclinical and clinical trials, that the drug is
safe and “will have the eﬀect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.”30 The approved labeling governs
the uses for which the drug can be marketed,31 hence the term “on-label” uses. Any divergence from the
approved labeling – an “oﬀ-label” use32 – in dosage, indications, method of administration or mixture with
another drug, renders the drug a new drug. The manufacturer would be required to resubmit another drug
approval form, and demonstrate, similar to the initial application, that it is “safe and eﬀective” for this new
use.33
While pharmaceutical companies are forbidden from promoting any oﬀ-label uses, doctors are not forbidden
from prescribing oﬀ-label uses. It is, in fact, an established and even mandated part of the practice of
medicine, because medical knowledge almost always outpaces the FDA approval process,34 and because
drug companies often do not seek FDA approval for all the possible uses of the drug, due to the time and
cost of ﬁling NDAs.35 It is often stated in the medical community that “if you didn’t use the drug in the
3021 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000). The FDA uses the substantial evidence test for safety and eﬃcacy of a drug. This includes
data from “adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations...by experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to
evaluate the safety and eﬀectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it can fairly and responsibly be concluded by
such experts that the drug is safe and eﬀective for such uses” (21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(ii)(b) (2000)) and data from “substantial
clinical experience...on the basis of which it can fairly and responsibly be concluded by qualiﬁed experts that the drug is safe
and eﬀective for such uses”. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(ii)(c).
3121 U.S.C. § 352 (2000) (stating that manufacturer promotion of oﬀ-label uses constitutes misbranding).
32See deﬁnition, supra note 7.
33See 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2000) (stating that the term “new drug” means...“any drug...not generally recognized...as safe
and eﬀective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.”) and 21 C.F.R. §
314.54 (stating that the manufacturer must submit an NDA for each intended new use of a drug which has been approved for
a diﬀerent use).
34In the 1990s, of the major complaints about the FDA leading to the passage of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act (FDAMA, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1994)) was the
long delay in approval times for new drugs, at one point, averaging 570 days to approve a new drug. See FDA Accountability
Report, supra note 29. One of the objectives of the FDAMA was to decrease approve time by providing more resources to the
FDA through prescription drug user fees. Recently, the review time has decreased to less than a year for about 80 percent of
NDAs. See Linda A. Suydam and Milan J. Kubic, FDA’s Implementation of FDAMA: An Interim Balance Sheet, 56 Food &
Drug L.J. 131, 133 (2001).
Clinical trial time also contribute to the lag time. For a new drug, clinical trials often take up to 6 years. See FDA
Accountability Report, supra note 29. During this time, researchers and clinicians are continuing to investigate and publish
new ﬁndings about drug uses.
35According to a recent published study, from the beginning of the process to the end, it takes an average of 15 years and
$500 million dollars to bring a new drug to market. See J.A. DiMasi, Trends in Drug Development Cost, Times, and Risks,
29 Drug Info. J. 375, 382 (1995), quoted in FDA Accountability Report, supra note 29. Pharmaceutical manufacturers often
13oﬀ-label way, you’d be guilty of malpractice.”36 The FDA has tolerated and at times, recognized the value
of oﬀ-label prescribing.37 It has emphasized that it does not purport to regulate the practice of medicine –
i.e., doctors’ prescribing judgment.38
This asymmetry in what can be marketed versus what can be prescribed has resulted in conﬂict over the
dissemination of information about oﬀ-label uses. Critics of the ban on manufacturer speech on oﬀ-label
uses argue that if doctors are allowed to prescribe oﬀ-label, they should have the most information about its
oﬀ-label eﬀects, and that manufacturers should be allowed to provide this information, given that they have
the most information about the drug.39 Restrictions on the discussion of oﬀ-label uses have an enormous
impact on many specialties. According to Donald R. Bennett, one-time director of the American Medical
Association’s Division of Drugs and Toxicology, 40 to 50 percent of all drugs are prescribed for oﬀ-label
uses.40 In some treatment areas, the percentage is even higher: 60 to 70 percent in oncology and 80 to 90
percent in pediatrics.41
The FDA and its supporters, on the other hand, argue that manufacturers’ commercial self-interest will
result in an increase of uses that have not been proven safe and eﬀective according to proper scientiﬁc testing
procedures, but are based on incomplete and perhaps biased evidence.42 Initially promising treatments are
are unwilling to pay the cost to apply for another indication until that indication will pay for itself in increased proﬁts. That
means that valid additional uses that simply do not a large patient base will often not get put on-label. See J. Howard Beales
III, Economic Analysis and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1370, 1387, 1392-93 (1994).
36See Fran Kritz, FDA Seeks to Add Drugs’ Use to Labels, Wash. Post., Mar. 29, 1997, at 11.
37See Request for Comment on Citizen Petition, 59 Fed. Reg. at 59,821 (stating that: “Unapproved, or more precisely,
unlabeled uses may be appropriate and rational in certain circumstances, and may, in fact reﬂect approaches to drug therapy that
have been extensively reported in medical literature...Valid new uses for drugs already on the market are often ﬁrst discovered
through serendipitous observations and therapeutic innovations, subsequently conﬁrmed by well-planned and executed clinical
investigations.”).
38The FDCA expressly prohibits the FDA from regulating physicians’ prescribing practice. See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (stating
that the FDCA shall not be construed to “limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or
administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-
patient relationship.”).
39See e.g. Charles J. Walsh and Alissa Pyrich, FDA Eﬀorts to Control the Flow of Information at Pharmaceutical Industry-
Sponsored Medical Education Programs: A Regulatory Overdose, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1325 (1994).
40See Andrew A. Skolnick, Pro-Free Enterprise Group Challenges FDA’s Authority to Regulate Drug Companies’ Speech,
271(5) JAMA 332 (Feb 2, 1994).
41See id.
42See Request for Comment on Citizen Petition, 59 Fed. Reg. at 59,822 (“Promotion of unapproved uses can encourage
physicians and patients to make decisions based on statements or claims that are, in many cases, supported by little or no
14often later shown to be unsafe or ineﬀective after more extensive testing is done.43
B. Authority to regulate misbranding for intended uses
In its ﬁnal guidance on CME, the FDA asserted, in addition to its long-established power to regulate labeling
and advertising, a justiﬁcation not raised in the draft guidance44: that “a drug or device shall be deemed
misbranded unless its labeling bears adequate directions for use.”45 This justiﬁcation allows the FDA to
regulate speech about oﬀ-label uses made at CME because “[o]ral statements and materials presented at
industry-supported scientiﬁc and educational activities may provide evidence of a product’s intended use.
If these statements or materials promote a use that is inconsistent with the product’s approved labeling,
the product is misbranded under section 502(f)(1) of the [FDCA] for failure to bear labeling with adequate
directions for all intended uses.”46 This regulates speech by placing pharmaceutical manufacturers in a
“Catch-22” bind: if they want to discuss a new “intended use,” then they must provide adequate directions
data.”).
43See id. at 59,824-59,826 (describing several real-life examples). For example, the FDA cites an example where physicians be-
gan using anti-arrhythmic agents on post-heart-attack patients, on the theory that lowing the rate of ventricular premature beats
will increase chances of survival. More extensive controlled studies were conducted showed this theory to be unsubstantiated
and that use of anti-arrhythmic agents in fact increased the mortality rate. It is important to note that no manufacturer ever
attempted to promote this use; the FDA uses this example to highlight the consequences if a manufacturer had to demonstrate
“the potential power of plausible, but under-documented claims”. Id. at 59,824.
44The Draft CME Guidance only cited the FDA’s authority to regulate labeling and advertising. See Draft CME Guidance,
57 Fed. Reg. 56,412.
45Final CME Guidance, at 64,075, referring to 21 U.S.C. 352(f)(1).
46Id. “Adequate directions for use”, as deﬁned in a regulation interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 352(f), means “directions under which
the layman can use a drug safely and for the purposes for which it is intended...Directions for use may be inadequate because,
among other reasons, of omission, in whole or in part, or incorrect speciﬁcation of:
a) statements of all conditions, purposes, or uses for which such drug is intended, including conditions, purposes or uses for
which it is prescribed, recommended, or suggested in its oral, written, printed, or graphic advertising, and conditions, purposes
or uses for which the drug is commonly used; except that such statements shall not refer to conditions, uses, or purposes for
which the drug can be safely used under the supervision of a practice licensed by law and for which it is advertised solely to
such practitioner...”
21 C.F.R. § 201.5.
15for use on the label. But they are not allowed to put any other uses on the label other than what the FDA
has approved.47 In this rather indirect way, the FDA bans speech on oﬀ-label uses at CME.
C. Authority over labeling and advertising
The ban on promotion of oﬀ-label uses (for lack of adequate directions for use) is only one, though per-
haps the most restrictive, of the FDA’s regulation of information about pharmaceutical drugs. The FDA
can also regulate the substance of labels and advertisements discussing approved uses, generally to “curb
overstatement in product claims and encourage balanced disclosure of side eﬀects, contraindications,48 and
warnings.”49
Labeling is deﬁned in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the FDA’s organic statute and the
source of most of its regulatory authority, as “all labels and other written, printed, or graphic material (1)
upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”50 “Accompanying”
has been interpreted broadly by the courts to encompass not only materials traveling with the article, but
can also include materials in any location that “supplements or explains” the product.51 Thus almost any
written, or “enduring” material52 describing the product could be deemed “labeling.” Although this cannot
47See 21 U.S.C. § 352.
48“A ‘contraindication’ is some condition that makes use of a drug undesirable. For example, if a drug should not be taken
by a pregnant woman, then pregnancy is a contraindication for that drug.” Paul H. Rubin, From Bad to Worse: Recent FDA
Initiatives and Consumer Health, in Bad Prescription for the First Amendment at 104 n.4
49See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard T. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 459 (2d ed. 1991) (describing the general eﬀect of 21
U.S.C. § 352(n)).
5021 U.S.C. § 321(m).
51Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948).
52“Enduring materials” is a term often used in the relevant literature to describe reprints of scientiﬁc journal articles and
medical textbooks. See Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding Awkward Alchemy in the Oﬀ-Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-
Protected Independent Research Should Not Transmogrify into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product Manufacturers
Distribute It, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 963, 973 at n.41 (1999).
16be extended to encompass the oral speech of CME speakers, it could be used to regulate written materials
distributed in conjunction with a presentation.53 In addition, the approved content for the label governs
promotion in other channels, as Part B above, describing misbranding, demonstrated.
Advertising, if one accepts the expansive deﬁnition provided by the FDA, could cover the speech at CME.
“Advertising” is not deﬁned in the FDCA, but in the Final CME Guidance, the FDA “[interpreted] the term
...to include information (other than labeling) that originates from the same source as the product and that
is intended to supplement or explain the product.”54 FDA did not cite a source for this deﬁnition, however,
and CME speech does not seem to be of the same kind as other items declared to be advertisements in the
FDA regulations: “advertisements in published journals, magazines, other periodicals, and newspapers, and
advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, and telephone communication systems.”55
Critics have asserted that the FDA has never asserted such an expansive deﬁnition for advertising until this
guidance.56 Although an agency has discretion to deﬁne terms in its own regulations,57 it would be a new
addition to the items included as advertising.58
Advertisements promoting approved uses must be balanced, by including a “true statement” in “brief sum-
53But see cases stating that even labeling does not include every written statement about a product, such as United States
v. 24 Bottles “Sterling Vinegar & Honey, Etc.,” 338 F.2d 157, 158-59 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating that “[t]he distinguishing
characteristic of a label is that, in some manner or another, it is presented to the customer in immediate connection with his
view and his purchase of a product”); United States v. Guardian Chem. Corp., 410 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that
“[i]t seems to stretch the meaning beyond the limit of elasticity” to say that literature disseminated at a medical convention
accompanies the sale of a product).
54Final CME Guidance at 64,076.
5521 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1).
56See Mark E. Boulding, The Statutory Basis for FDA Regulation of Scientiﬁc and Educational Information, 4 J. Pharmacy
& L. 123, 141 (1995) (“FDA has very little statutory support for claiming that everything a manufacturer says that is not
labeling is advertising.”).
57A court will give great deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules. This deference is even greater than that
aﬀorded an agency’s interpretations of the statutes it enforces. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (“Since this
involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the
regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt....[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which
becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”) quoting Bowles v. Seminole
Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-414 (1945). See also John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996).
58See Boulding, supra note 56, at 141 (“Any attempt to sweep in bona ﬁde scientiﬁc or educational meetings or materials
into the category of ‘advertising’ would likely meet with resistance in the courts.”).
17mary relating to side eﬀects, contraindications, and eﬀectiveness.”59 What the brief statement must present
is often very restrictive:
An advertisement does not satisfy the requirement that it present a “true statement” of information
in brief summary relating to side eﬀects, contraindications, and eﬀectiveness if....[i]t fails to present
a fair balance between information relating to side eﬀects and contraindications and information
relating to eﬀectiveness of the drug in that the information relating to eﬀectiveness is presented in
greater scope, depth, or detail than is required by section 502(n) of the act and this information is
not fairly balanced by a presentation of a summary of true information relating to side eﬀects and
contraindications of the drug.60
Applied to CME, the labeling and advertising provisions “require [companies] to ensure that ...discussions
of [their] products are not false or misleading in content and do not lack fair balance.”61 “In particular,
discussions of unapproved uses, which can be an important component of scientiﬁc and educational activities,
are not permissible in programs that are or can be (because the provider is not functionally independent)
subject to substantive inﬂuence by companies that market products related to the discussion.”62
D. The CME Guidance document
1. The development of the guidance
The FDA ﬁrst began investigating the issue of industry involvement in CME in the early 1990s. The FDA
turned its regulatory eye to CME because “[t]he agency’s experience over the years in regulating drug and
device safety and eﬀectiveness has demonstrated that regulatory control over package inserts, user manuals,
and traditional advertising formats may be rendered meaningless if the company is free to engage in aggressive
promotion outside of these formats.”63 The FDA feared that pharmaceutical manufacturers were using CME
5921 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3) (2000).
61Draft CME Guidance, 57 Fed. Reg. at 56,413 n.1.
62Id. at 56,412.
63Request for Comment on Citizen Petition, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820.
18as a way to get around the advertising and labeling regulations by funding others to say what they cannot
say directly.
CME sponsorship has potential as a powerful promotional tool, because of the authority associated with
ostensibly scientiﬁc information and because CMEs have a ready-made audience of professionals looking to
fulﬁll continuing education requirements.64 Manufacturer sponsorship had been on the rise, as providers look
for sources to allay the cost of providing CME. Data gathered by the Accreditation Council for Continuing
Medical Education (ACCME), an organization that oversees and sets voluntary standards for CME, show
that industry support represented about half of the $1.1 billion spent on CME in 1999,65 usually in the
form of general course grants or speaker funds.66 Industry support doubled from 1996-99.67 Total CME
expenditures have increased 71 percent.68 Studies have shown that company-supported CME activities are
often slanted in favor of the supporting company’s products, and that physicians who attend these seminars
later prescribe the company’s drugs more often than competing drugs.69
Before it had developed any formal guidance documents, the FDA took case-by-case enforcement actions
against pharmaceutical manufacturers it found to be using CME inappropriately. 70 For example, one
medical device manufacturer received a warning letter from the FDA after allegedly sponsoring a program
where an individual “associated with” the company had provided information and devices used for hands-on
training for an oﬀ-label use.71 The letter stated that “[s]upporting such programs and providing devices for
64All state medical licensing boards require licensed physicians to complete yearly CME. The requirements vary widely from
state to state, ranging from 12 credit hours per year to 50 credit hours per year. See State Medical Licensure Requirements and
Statistics, 2003, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/40/table14 03.pdf (last visited April 15, 2003).
65Susan L. Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations. Part 2: Organizational Issues, 136(5) Annals of Internal Med. 403-406
(Mar. 5, 2002).
66Id.
67See id.
68See id.
69See A. Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 283 JAMA 373-380 (2000).
70See Kessler, 880 F. Supp. at 28 (describing, in the discussion of facts, several enforcement actions taken by the FDA).
71See id.
19the purposes of hands-on training in the use of devices for this unapproved use constitutes promotion of the
device for such use.”72 It then asked the company for a “written response detailing your plans to correct
these violations, and your intentions to comply with this Warning Letter.”73 According to the complaint
submitted by the Washington Legal Foundation in its case, this was representative of several enforcement
actions taken even before the FDA instituted a formal policy.74
Informal, case-by-case enforcement actions were later articulated in a limited-release draft document (the
“Drug Company Supported Activities In Scientiﬁc or Educational Contexts: Draft Concept Paper”) and
then more formally in the “Draft Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Ac-
tivities”75 on which the FDA requested comment. The Draft CME Guidance focused on distinguishing
promotional from non-promotional sponsorship based on a written agreement between the pharmaceutical
manufacturer and the CME provider. The written agreement would set out the limits on the pharmaceutical
manufacturer’s role,76 and include provisions about:
1)
statement of purpose
2) control of content and selection of presenters and moderators
3) disclosure of ﬁnancial relationships
4) supporting company involvement in content
72Id.
73Id.
74See id.
75Draft CME Guidance, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,412.
76Id.
205) ancillary promotional activities
6) objectivity and balance
7) limitations on data
8) discussion of unapproved uses
9) opportunities for debate
10) schedule of activities
The written agreement would provide that on all factors, the company would “take steps to ensure that it
has no role in the design or conduct of the program that might bias the treatment of the topic.”77 After
considering comments on the draft policy, the Final Guidance was issued on December 3, 1997.78
The Final CME Guidance places less emphasis on a written agreement.79 Instead, it focuses on evaluating
promotion based on 12 factors, most of which derive from the provisions for the written agreement it used
in the Draft CME Guidance. Generally, the Final CME Guidance declares the FDA’s intention to regulate
pharmaceutical company sponsorship of CME seminars on each of these grounds if the FDA ﬁnds the sem-
inar promotional in nature, based on a consideration of these factors.80 This position was the same as the
Draft CME Guidance. In addition, it maintains the same regulatory position prohibiting oﬀ-label uses and
requiring fair balance in the discussion of oﬀ-label uses. The 12 factors it identiﬁes as relevant to the issue
of promotion are:
77Id.
78Final CME Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074.
79See id. at 64,084.
80Id.
211)
control of content and selection of presenters and moderators
2) disclosures
3) focus of the program
4) relationship between provider and supporting company
5) providers involvement in sales or marketing
6) provider’s demonstrated failure to meet standards
7) multiple presentations
8) audience selection
9) opportunities for discussion
10) dissemination
11) ancillary promotional activities
12) complaints.81
The guidance also notes that this is not an exhaustive list; “other factors may be appropriate for consideration
81Id.
22in a particular case.”82
Thus the critical issue for pharmaceutical companies sponsoring CME is whether the FDA considers its
sponsorship promotional. If it does, the program will have to conform to the FDA’s extensive regulations
on labeling and advertising, including the prohibition of discussion of oﬀ-label uses. Although a guidance
document is not legally binding,83 the FDA has a policy of adhering to them in its enforcement decisions.84
2. The Guidance Document’s eﬀect on CME
The guidance document has two major eﬀects.85 First, it results in a ﬂat ban on all mention of oﬀ-label uses at
CME deemed promotional. Secondly, it requires the presentations at CME to present the drugs in a way that
does not lack “fair balance,”86 as evidenced by the approved labeling and advertising requirements. One can
imagine several ways in which CME activities could violate the labeling and advertising provisions governing
on-label uses. For example, a violation could occur if a speaker voiced an opinion, perhaps with some new
clinical evidence, that the drug’s side eﬀects were more negligible than the FDA has said and approved of its
use despite the side eﬀects. Portraying the drug in a more positive light could be “misleading,” according
to the FDA, if the FDA takes a more negative view of its side eﬀects and contraindications. For another
example, CME presentations could run afoul of the FDA’s advertising regulations if comparative discussions
82Id.
83See 21 U.S.C. § 371(h). See also Final CME Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074-01 (acknowledging that the guidance document
has no legal eﬀect).
84See Administrative Practices and Procedures; Good Guidance Practices, 65 Fed. Reg. 56468, 56,477 (Sept. 19, 2000)
(stating that “[although guidance documents do not legally bind FDA, they represent the agency’s current thinking. Therefore,
FDA employees may depart from guidance documents only with appropriate justiﬁcation and supervisory concurrence.”).
85For analytical purposes, I assume a situation where the manufacturer would feel compelled to follow the guidance, because
the guidance document describes how the FDA will use its enforcement power, although “[a]ctivities that fail to fall within this
traditional safe harbor are not per se illegal, but...are subject to regulation.” Draft CME Guidance, 57 Fed. Reg. at 56,412.
86Id. at 56,413 n.1.
23(of the relative merits of two or more drugs) were not based on substantial evidence (typically two adequate
and well-controlled clinical trials).87 Fewer or less rigorous studies would not suﬃce. Some say this high bar
of substantial evidence is not a standard that should be used in a scientiﬁc forum meant to promote free
scientiﬁc discussion.88
3. Arguments for and against regulation
The controversy over the FDA’s decision to debate about whether CME needs to be regulated rages on
because there is no conclusive evidence on how well physicians are able to critically evaluate information
presented in CME. Cognitive studies on whether physicians are able to discount promotional biases in infor-
mation show conﬂicting results.89
The FDA argues that CME is dangerously exploitable because doctors are more inclined to trust more the
information provided in CME than information provided in an advertisement or other clearly promotional
literature. Thus the impact of misleading information could be far greater. Physicians value highly the
information presented in CME, citing CME, along with medical journal reading, as the most signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on their practice.90 In contrast, studies have shown that labeling, though tightly controlled by
the FDA, has minimal impact on physicians’ prescribing decisions.91 Anecdotes from these studies reveal
that some doctors never read the label, depending instead on their training, information from journals and
87See Comments of Pﬁzer, Inc. in the Matter of Request for Comments on First Amend-
ment Issues 125 (Sept. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Pﬁzer First Amendment Comments], available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/02/Sep02/091602/80027f2d.pdf (last visited April 15, 2003).
88See id.
89See discussion of several studies generally in Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diﬀusion of
Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 373, 379-387 (2002).
90See E. Ray Stinson & Dorothy A. Mueller, Survey of Health Professionals’ Information Habits and Needs, 243 JAMA 140,
140 (1980). However, other studies show CME as having a more minimal impact. See Dave Davis et al., Impact of Formal
Continuing Medical Education: Do Conferences, Workshops, Rounds and Other Traditional Continuing Education Activities
Change Physician Behavior or Health Care Outcomes?, 282 JAMA 867, 867 (1999).
91See Noah, supra note 89, at 438.
24other scientiﬁc sources, and their formulary committee, to make prescribing decisions.92 Physicians are also
required to attend a certain number of CME in order to maintain board certiﬁcation,93 providing a ready-
made audience for promotion.
In addition, while physicians do have the training necessary to evaluate the information presented at CME,
they do not always have the time. The amount of medical literature has increased exponentially; many
doctors say they must struggle to keep up with the amount of new literature.94 There is growing frag-
mentation among expert communities, leading to fewer consensuses and more confusion about appropriate
treatments.95 Some studies have shown that, for whatever reason, physicians do not discount the information
in promotional literature as much as they should.96
But the guidance’s critics oppose the regulations because they feel that the beneﬁts of pharmaceutical spon-
sorship outweigh the dangers of biased information. Industry-supported CME ﬁlls an important need in
disseminating information about new treatments quickly, because pharmaceutical companies have incentives
to publicize their own advances.97 This helps speed up new medical care, because “physicians have sometimes
been slow to adopt eﬃcacious new therapies into routine clinical practice and therefore to improve patient
care.”98 In addition, critics say, the very purpose of CME is to discuss the uses and views about drugs that
conﬂict with the labeling and the advertising. Said one CME provider: “If you prevent the discussion of
oﬀ-label use of medications, there would be little point in holding CME programs. One could just read the
package insert and one would know all one needs to know about the drug.”99
92See id.
93See discussion of CME requirements, supra, note 64.
94See Noah, supra note 89, at 382.
95See id.
96See id. at 409.
97See Coyle, supra note 65, at 403-406.
98Id.
99See Skolnick, supra note 40, at 332. The FDA has also conceded that CME serves an important purpose in advancing
scientiﬁc knowledge about drugs that has not yet been fully accepted to be included in the labeling. “Labeling is not intended
to be a dispositive treatise of all possible medical opinion....The opinions of individual physicians on such matters can be, and
are, thoroughly and adequately discussed through medical journals, treatises, meetings of professional associations, and other
similar events.” 40 Fed. Reg. 28,582, 28,583 (July 7, 1975), quoted in Noah, supra note 89, at 436.
25They also discount the danger that is presented by allegedly promotional information.100 Trained physicians
are capable of “[taking] the interests of speakers, economic or otherwise, into account in evaluating for them-
selves the merit of the information and ideas being exchanged” and critically analyzing such information.101
After all, they say, if the FDA has enough conﬁdence in physicians’ discretion to support their authority to
prescribe oﬀ-label, they should have enough conﬁdence in their ability to process the data about oﬀ-label
uses.102
In addition, there is little danger of physicians falling under the promotional sway of pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers because other sources of information are available to provide opposing views.103 The world of
pharmaceutical information is one of “myriad speakers – from medical journals to patient advocacy groups
to HMO beneﬁts managers to dietary supplement manufacturers – each of whom has diﬀering motivations
in initiating public debate concerning various prescription drugs and diﬀerent messages that they would like
to convey.”104 Thus, no source of information is objective; each source has its own interest it would like
to further. Some of these interests are against the manufacturers’ interests and would serve the purpose
of balancing the manufacturers’ speech. Because these interests are at times in opposition to the pharma-
ceutical manufacturers’ interest, the better policy choice would be to allow the manufacturers’ positions to
100In addition, pharmaceutical manufacturers have denied that the primary reason they sponsor CME is to generate sales;
“their main goal is to exchange information to promote better patient care,” said the president of the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), adding that “pharmaceutical companies generate considerable ‘goodwill’ through
their support of CME and, to the extent that physicians become more knowledgeable about the beneﬁts of their products,
they may also generate increased sales.” Alan F. Holmer, Editorial, Industry Strong Supports Continuing Medical Education,
285(15) JAMA 2014 (2001).
101See Brief of Amici Curiae Pﬁzer, Inc. at 16, Nike v. Kasky, (No. 02-575) (U.S. 2003) [hereinafter Pﬁzer Brief], citing Peel
v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990) (rejecting notion that recipients of commercial
speech “are no more discriminating than the audience for children’s television”). Courts have also supported this position. See
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (“A physician’s livelihood depends upon the ability to make accurate, life-and-death decisions
based on the scientiﬁc evidence before them.”).
102See Glenn C. Smith, Oﬀ-Label Research Ruling Missteps, Nat’l L.J. A19, col. 1, Aug. 31, 1998 (“The agency freely
allows, and has, in written statements, favored physician oﬀ-label prescribing. Yet these same discerning physicians need, in
the FDA’s eyes, aggressive action to protect them against being deceived by oﬀ-label research once drug companies call the
doctors’ attention to the data.”).
103See Pﬁzer Brief, supra note 101, at 3a (“The agency’s regulations appear to be premised on the concept that the manu-
facturer is the only speaker concerning its drug product and that regulating manufacturer speech is the sole means of ensuring
that physicians and consumers are fully advised about drug beneﬁts and risks. This is largely not the case.”).
104See id.
26be tested “in the crucible of debate through the clash of informed but opposing scientiﬁc and technological
viewpoints.”105
The rigorous testing of scientiﬁc speech through the dissemination of multiple viewpoints is even more impor-
tant in an informational environment where truth is elusive and ever-changing, as new scientiﬁc discoveries
are made. The FDA justiﬁes its constraints upon expressing certain opinions about the eﬀect or approval
or disapproval of certain treatments by a rule that labeling and advertising must be “truthful and non-
misleading.” But in practice, this rule is hard to implement because of the nature of scientiﬁc truth, as the
FDA has acknowledged:
However, FDA’s broad experience reviewing promotional materials and scientiﬁc data suggests that
determining whether information is “truthful” may depend on a variety of factors...For example, a
preliminary study may suggest a result that appears “truthful” at the time the preliminary study is
ﬁrst announced, but subsequent studies may fail to reproduce those results, disprove the preliminary
result, or even show that the preliminary study was ﬂawed. Given the wide variety of factors, how
should one determine whether the information in question is, indeed, “truthful”?106
By promulgating the guidance document, the FDA is in eﬀect appointing itself the arbiter of what is truthful
at industry-supported CME. The idea that truth is what the FDA says it is, and that pharmaceutical
manufacturers are not allowed to challenge its version of truth by presenting conﬂicting information that it
may have, has alarmed members of the pharmaceutical and medical communities because of its potential
to hinder scientiﬁc debate. As two scholars succinctly stated, “The FDA is not a peer review mechanism
for the scientiﬁc community.”107 This opposition to FDA regulation of allegedly scientiﬁc debate led to the
following litigation.
105Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
107Lars Noah and Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling Controls and the First Amendment, 47
Fla. L. Rev. 63, 96 (1995).
2728III. The WLF Decisions
A. The case in the district court
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia ﬁrst reached the substance of the controversy in its
decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman.108 This suit was ﬁrst ﬁled in 1994109 by the WLF
on behalf of its physician members to vindicate their rights as listeners to receive the speech on oﬀ-label
uses, not to vindicate the rights of pharmaceutical manufacturers to speak, as might be expected.110 It
is also important to note that this litigation concerned only the CME guidance’s eﬀect on promotion of
oﬀ-label uses, but not its eﬀect on promotion of on-label uses – that they must provide an FDA-dictated
“fair balance” of information. In this case, the WLF’s challenge was to both the ban on oﬀ-label speech in
the dissemination of enduring materials (reprints of scientiﬁc articles and medical reference books)111 and
on oﬀ-label speech at CME.112 The court considered these two regulations together.
The court held the FDA’s ban on discussion of oﬀ-label uses at CME unconstitutional because the restrictions
“are considerably more extensive than necessary to further the substantial government interest in encouraging
108WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998). A previous opinion was issued in Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F.
Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1995) (denying FDA’s motion to dismiss).
109See Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, No. CIV 1:94CV01306 (RCL) (D.D.C. ﬁled Jun. 13, 1994), cited in Richard
M. Cooper, The WLF Case Thus Far: Not With a Bang, but a Whimper, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 477 (2000). This complaint
followed the citizen petition ﬁled by the WLF on Oct. 22, 1993, on which the FDA sought comment. See Request for Comment
on Citizen Petition, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820. The complaint and petition were ﬁled before the ﬁnal guidance was published, based
instead on the draft guidance and a series of FDA enforcement actions that the WLF contended constitututed ﬁnal agency
policy. See Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F.Supp. 26. The court rejected FDA’s motion to dismiss on the ground
that the case was not yet ripe because the agency had not yet ﬁnalized its policy, and held that the enforcement actions were
representative of a ﬁnal agency policy. See id. at 35. The ﬁnal guidance was published during the course of the litigation.
110The Supreme Court has held that listeners, as well as speakers, have a First Amendment right in speech. See e.g. Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Va. Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 757 (1976). The right of the listener is most often cited to justify commercial speech, and has particular applicability to
speech about drugs, because of the importance of information to drugs to listeners like doctors. “Such speech typically conveys
essential information about the drug product itself...Prescribing and purchasing decisions about pharmaceuticals are likely to
be based on factors such as indications, contraindications, and side eﬀects as much or more than on price alone.” See Kaplar,
supra note 1, at 57.
111The constitutional issues dealing with the dissemination of enduring materials are not covered in the scope of this paper.
112WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
29manufacturers to get new uses on-label.”113 The court arrived at this holding after a two-step analysis. First,
it decided how the speech involved in the regulation should be classiﬁed and second, after deciding that the
speech was properly characterized as commercial speech, it analyzed the regulation under the four-part test
for commercial speech. These two issues each merit further discussion.
1. The classiﬁcation of CME sponsorship
There were three choices the court had of characterizing pharmaceutical sponsorship of CME: conduct, fully-
protected “core” speech, or commercial speech. The court ﬁrst decided it was speech, not conduct.114 The
FDA had ﬁrst attempted to characterize the activity as conduct (which would then be subject only the to
expressive conduct law of the First Amendment – a much lower standard), but the court dispensed quickly
with the issue, saying while “the relevant ‘conduct’ is the oﬀ-label prescription of drugs by physicians[,]
[t]he distribution of enduring materials and sponsorship of CME seminars addressing and encouraging this
conduct is speech.... There may certainly be a ‘line’ between education and promotion as regards a drug
manufacturer’s marketing activities, but that is the line between pure speech and commercial speech, not
between speech and conduct.”115
The court also considered whether this was speech that fell outside the ambit of the First Amendment
because of the FDA’s extensive power to regulate the pharmaceutical industry.116 The court rejected the
FDA’s argument that the pharmaceutical industry was a “separate area of extensive regulation”117 and
so the greater power to prohibit an activity entirely includes the lesser power to prohibit speech about it,
113Id. at 73.
114Id. at 59.
115Id.
116Id at 61.
117Id.
30an argument which had been similarly rejected by the Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island.118 The Supreme Court’s oft-quoted statement in the Liquormart case presages many of the issues
touched upon by FDA regulation of CME. Regarding Rhode Island’s ban on advertising alcohol content in
advertising, a matter in which the state had power to regulate the sale of alcohol generally, the Court said:
The text of the First Amendment makes clear that the Constitution presumes that attempts to
regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct. That presumption accords
with the essential role that the free ﬂow of information plays in a democratic society. As a result, the
First Amendment directs that the government may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress
conduct.119
In contrast to the FDA’s oft-asserted claim that regulation of drugs and information go hand in hand,120 the
Court makes a sharp distinction between regulation of activity and regulation of information. This is the
ﬁrst example from this case of how the FDA’s approach to speech has diverged from the judicial approach.
The ﬁnal choice the court considered was one between fully-protected “core” speech121 and commercial
speech. “Core speech” is speech that has traditionally been protected by the First Amendment, and until
Bigelow v. Virginia in 1975,122 when the Supreme Court acknowledged qualiﬁed First Amendment protection
for commercial speech, was the only kind of speech meriting First Amendment protection.123 Political
speech is the paradigmatic example of core speech meriting protection, because of its importance to the
“free exchange of ideas,” and concern about its particular vulnerability because of its use in criticizing
the government, but courts have also consistently included scientiﬁc and educational speech within this
core.124 What falls in the category of commercial is still subject to debate, but the paradigmatic example
118517 U.S. 484 (1996).
120See note 1, supra.
121Fully-protected speech, core speech, and pure speech are all terms that courts and commentators have used to refer to
speech that is not commercial. For uniformity’s sake, I will refer to it as core speech hereinafter.
122421 U.S. 809 (1975).
123See e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding that commercial advertising did not have as much value as
core speech and so did not merit First Amendment protection).
124See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that academic speech is at
31of commercial speech is “speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”125 It is at the
boundaries of core and commercial speech – when speech allegedly proposes a commercial transaction but
includes other informative elements as well – where the most debate has occurred.
The court found the core/commercial issue to be the most diﬃcult issue,126 as “the communications present
one of those ‘complex mixtures of commercial and non-commercial elements.”’127 In addition, the dual
character of the speech only arises because of the identity of the speaker; if a pharmaceutical sponsor
were not involved, then the speech would certainly be characterized as scientiﬁc speech meriting core First
Amendment protection.128
The court applied the three-part test of core/commercial speech set out in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Co.,129 the most deﬁnitive test the Supreme Court has announced for determining whether something is
core or commercial speech. The factors that Bolger directs a court to examine are:
1)
whether the speech is concededly an advertisement;
2) whether the speech refers to a speciﬁc product;
the core of the First Amendment); Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D.D.C.
1991) (“It is equally settled...though less commonly the subject of litigation, that the First Amendment protects scientiﬁc
expression and debate just as it protects political and artistic expression.”).
125Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
126See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
127Id., quoting Bolger v. Young, 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
128See id. (“It is beyond dispute that when considered outside of the context of manufacturer promotion of their drug products,
CME seminars...merit the highest degree of constitutional protection.”).
129Bolger, 463 U.S. 60.
323) whether the speech has an economic motivation for disseminating the speech.130
On the ﬁrst factor, the court found that sponsorship of CME are “advertisements as that term is commonly
understood.”131 It reached this conclusion by assuming that the purpose of drug manufacturers in sponsoring
CME was to publicize the drug to physicians in hopes that they would prescribe the drug. Said the court,
“the fact that an eﬀective means for accomplishing that goal is through providing the academic research
results generated by others does not meant that the activity is not an ‘advertisement.”’132 On the second
factor, the court easily found that the CME “presumptively refer to a speciﬁc product – the drug that is the
subject of the oﬀ-label use.”133 On the third prong, the court found that the “pharmaceutical companies
clearly have an economic motivation for providing the information;...the promotional eﬀorts at issue have
a positive eﬀect on a physician’s prescription practices and therefore on sales.”134 Concluding that the facts
of this case satisﬁed the three factors of Bolger, the court concluded that the speech at issue was commercial
speech. The ﬁnding of commercial speech is important because it means that governmental restrictions
undergo a lower level of scrutiny – most particularly that “content-based restrictions on commercial speech
may be permissible”135 “[i]n light of the greater potential for deception or confusion in the context of certain
advertising messages”.136
130Id. at 66.
131WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
132Id.
133Id.
134Id.
135Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65 (citations omitted).
136Id.
332. The commercial speech test applied
Once the court determined that CME and the distribution of enduring materials was commercial speech,
it then analyzed the FDA’s restriction on the speech in the guidance documents according to the four-part
Central Hudson test of commercial speech. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission of New York, a leading Supreme Court case on commercial speech, held that commercial speech
had a lower level of constitutional protection than did core speech. A governmental restriction on commercial
speech was not unconstitutional if:
1)
the speech “[concerns] a lawful activity and [is not] misleading”;
2) the “asserted government’s interest is substantial”;
3) “the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted”;
4) the restriction “is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”137
On the ﬁrst factor, the court ﬁrst found that “[t]he proper inquiry is not whether the speech violates a law or
a regulation, but rather whether the conduct that the speech promotes violates the law.”138 It determined
this conduct was doctors’ oﬀ-label prescriptions, not manufacturers’ oﬀ-label promotion; since doctors were
allowed to prescribe oﬀ-label, the activity was lawful.139 On the issue of whether the speech is misleading, the
court ﬁrst rejected the FDA’s argument that misleading could mean “potentially misleading” – “[i]n order
137Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
138WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
139See id.
34to end the Central Hudson analysis on the ﬁrst prong, the speech must be inherently misleading, which is
deﬁned in Central Hudson as more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”140 Because the FDA did
not object to the distribution of enduring materials when physicians requested it from the manufacturer,
nor to CME presenting the same oﬀ-label ﬁndings if the seminar was not sponsored by a manufacturer, the
court determined that it was not inherently misleading.141 Here, the court rejected the FDA’s approach
in rejecting its position as the arbiter of truth, noting that “the ﬁndings presented by a physician at a
CME seminar are not ‘untruthful’ or ‘inherently misleading merely because the FDA has not yet had the
opportunity to evaluate the claim.”142
For the second factor, the FDA asserted two governmental interests: 1) the government’s interest in ensuring
that physicians receive accurate and unbiased information so that they may make informed prescription
choices and 2) providing manufacturers with incentive to get unapproved uses on label.143 The court found
the ﬁrst illegitimate, the second legitimate.144
140Id. at 66-67.
141Id. at 67.
142Id.
143Id. at 69.
144See id.
35The ﬁrst ruling would seem to upset the whole regulatory ap-
proach the FDA has brought to CME and promotion through pre-
sentation of scientiﬁc information; most of the justiﬁcations and
discussions in the guidance documents have dealt with the FDA’s
concern about the promotional use of CME that would deceive
physicians. However, the court dismissed this concern, saying that
“[a] physician’s livelihood depends upon the ability to make ac-
curate, life-and-death decisions based upon the scientiﬁc evidence
before them. They are certainly capable of critically evaluating
journal articles or textbook reprints that are mailed to them or
the ﬁndings presented at CME seminars.”145 The court expressed
sharp disapproval for what it perceived to be the FDA’s paternal-
istic attitude toward doctors, and cited case law that stood for the
general proposition that courts normally disapprove of restrictions
on speech “for the good of the recipient.”146
The court found the second asserted interest to be substantial, however, “[i]n light of the fact that Congress
has declared that all uses must be proven safe and eﬀective by the FDA, and has recently aﬃrmed that
position through the 1997 Food and Drug Amendments [FDAMA].”147 It also found that the guidance
documents directly advanced the government interest in getting uses on-label, which satisﬁed the third
Central Hudson factor.148
145Id. at 70.
146Id. Courts have consistently struck down paternalistic “protection of the listener” interests as legitimate government
interests. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 (stating that while the state is free to set professional standards for
its pharmacists, “it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are
oﬀering.”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (J. Stevens, concurring) (“In my opinion, the Government’s
asserted interest, that consumers should be misled or uninformed for their own protection, does not suﬃce to justify restrictions
on protected speech in any context, whether under ‘exacting scrutiny’ or some other standard.”).
147WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 71. For this provision of the FDAMA, see Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, § 551(b) (to be
codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa et seq.).
148WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
36It was on the fourth and ﬁnal Central Hudson factor that the court found the CME guidance unconstitutional;
it found that they were “considerably more extensive than necessary to further the substantial government
interest in encouraging manufacturers to get new uses on-label.”149 It based this ﬁnding on the “fact that
there exists less-burdensome alternatives to this restriction on commercial speech”150 – for example, full
disclosure of sponsorship by the manufacturer. The court felt that full disclosure would address many of the
FDA’s concerns – physicians would not be misled if they knew that manufacturers were the providers of the
information, and many regulations still exist for manufacturers to get uses on-label.151 Once ﬁnding that the
CME guidance document violated the First Amendment, the court enjoined the FDA from applying such
regulations, ordering, inter alia, that the FDA “shall not in any way prohibit, restrict, sanction or otherwise
seek to limit any pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer or any other person...from suggesting
content or speakers to an independent program providers in connection with a continuing medical education
seminar program or other symposium, regardless of whether uses of drugs and medical devices other than
those approved by the FDA are to be discussed.”152
B. The case on appeal and beyond
However, the district court’s decision was not the last word on the issue. Several more developments on the
case followed. The FDAMA153 had changed the law on the dissemination of reprints of enduring materials
on oﬀ-label uses in its provision that a manufacturer may distribute such materials if it complies with several
requirements. The manufacturer must submit an application for approval of the oﬀ-label use,154 provide
149Id.
150Id.
151See discussion of other incentives, Part III.C.2, infra.
152Id. at 74-75.
153Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296.
154See 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(1) (2000).
37the materials to the FDA prior to dissemination,155 provide the materials in an unedited form,156 include
disclosures that the materials refer to an oﬀ-label use,157 and, if the FDA deems it appropriate, include
“additional objective and scientiﬁcally sound information... necessary to provide objectivity and balance.”158
Once the FDAMA became eﬀective, shortly after WLF I was decided, the FDA then moved to have its
injunction conﬁned to express provisions of the guidance documents, given that the enduring materials
guidance was superseded by the FDAMA.159 The FDA wanted to be certain that it could implement the
FDAMA provisions without violating the injunction, which was expressed in general terms not necessarily
conﬁned to the documents at issue in the litigation.160 The District Court denied the FDA’s motion and
held that the FDAMA provisions and the guidance documents all violated the First Amendment.161 The
FDA appealed this ruling.162
The appeal went before the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. During oral argument, the FDA
changed its position, now asserting that the guidance documents were simply a safe harbor for manufacturers
155See id. at 360aaa(b)(4).
156See id. at 360aaa-1.
157See id. at 360aaa(b)(6).
158Id. at 360aaa(c).
15913 F. Supp. 2d 16.
160The amended injunction stated that the guidance documents on CME, on enduring materials and the applicable FDAMA
provisions were “contrary to rights secured by the United States Constitution and therefore must be set aside pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) except insofar as they are consistent with the injunctive provisions below.” Final Amended Order Granting
Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Friedman, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 88. The injunction then goes on to prohibit the
FDA:
a) from disseminating or redistributing to physicians or other medical professionals any article concerning prescription drugs
or medical devices previous published in a bona ﬁde peer-reviewed professional journal, regardless of whether such article
includes a signiﬁcant or exclusive focus on unapproved uses for drugs or medical devices that are approved by FDA for other
uses and regardless of whether such article reports the original study on which FDA approval of the drug or device in question
was based;
b) from disseminating or redistributing to physicians or other medical professionals any reference textbook (including any
medical textbook or compendium) or any portion thereof published by a bona ﬁde independent publisher and otherwise generally
available for sale in bookstores or other distribution channels where similar books are normally available, regardless of whether
such reference textbook or portion thereof includes a signiﬁcant or exclusive focus on unapproved uses for drugs or medical
devices that are approved by FDA for other uses;
c) from suggesting content or speakers to an independent program provider in connection with a continuing medical education
seminar program or other symposium regardless of whether unapproved uses for drugs or medical devices that are approved by
FDA for other uses are to be discussed.
Id. at 88-89.
16156 F. Supp. 2d 81.
162WLF II, 202 F.2d 331.
38under which certain forms of conduct are protected.163 Upon questioning by the court, for example, the FDA
said that “[i]f a drug manufacturer wishes to suggest content to a CME program provider in a manner that
runs afoul of all the Guidance’s twelve ‘factors’ that, by itself, is not a violation of law” but the FDA would
retain the prerogative to use the promotional conduct in an misbranding or “intended use” enforcement
action.164 At argument, the WLF agreed with this interpretation.165 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit found
that because the parties agreed that the statute and guidance document do not “facially violate the First
Amendment,” there was “no constitutional controversy between the parties that remains to be resolved.”166
Accordingly, it “[vacated] the district court’s decisions and injunctions insofar as they declare the FDAMA
and the CME Guidance unconstitutional.”167 Because it found that there was no longer a constitutional
question in dispute, the D.C. Circuit did not reach the merits of the constitutional question, and expressly
stated that did not intend to “criticize the reasoning or the conclusions of the district court.”168
Despite the signs of judicial disapproval of its First Amendment approach from WLF I, after the Appeals
Court’s decision, the FDA issued a notice of the “Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney”
declaring that it would continue to use the CME Guidance to guide its enforcement, but that “if the agency
brings an enforcement action, a manufacturer may raise a First Amendment defense.”169 It took no further
steps to conform the CME guidance to the First Amendment.
That the guidance document is still in eﬀect and that the FDA intends to follow its policy is clear from
the last disposition of the case. After the appellate decision, the WLF moved to conﬁrm and enforce the
163Id. at 335. The FDA’s change in position even confused the court, which stated that “the FDA’s view of the Act and the
CME Guidance was somewhat unclear: At times the FDA appeared to share WLF’s assessment that these provisions provide
legal authorization to restrict manufacturer speech, but more frequently the FDA asserted that they established nothing more
than a “safe harbor” ensuring that certain forms of conduct would not be used against manufacturers in misbranding and
“intended use” enforcement actions based on pre-existing legislative authority.” Id.
164Id. at 335-36.
165See id. at 336.
166Id.
167Id. at 337.
168Id. at 337 n.7.
169See WLF II Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286.
39injunction previously issued, based on the D.C. Circuit’s comment that it “did not reach the merits of the
district court’s First Amendment holdings and part of its injunction still stands.”170 Because the D.C. Circuit
vacated the injunction “insofar as [it] declare[s] the FDAMA and the CME Guidance unconstitutional”, the
District Court interpreted the issue to be “what portion of the injunction was grounded in law other than the
federal constitution?”171 It found that all parts of the injunction were based on its constitutional holdings,
and thus all were vacated by the appellate decision.172 However, it sharply criticized the FDA’s decision to
continue using the CME guidance, stating that:
To say that the FDA’s March 16, 2000 Notice ﬁnally clariﬁes the situation is a farce; the Notice
speciﬁcally invites a constitutional challenge to each and every one of its enforcement actions. That
is no way to establish policy on an issue that both sides argue is of – quite literally – life and death
proportions.173
The CME Guidance has a chilling eﬀect on CME sponsorship. Although a First Amendment defense is
available, many manufacturers are loathe to try such a strategy because the FDA wields enormous power
over manufacturers; it has the power to seize the entire product line at issue during litigation and to hold
up new approvals, among other things. It is unlikely that a manufacturer would risk such devastating
consequences, but rather would refrain from such speech from the start.
C. Analysis of the WLF I Decision
Because WLF I has been vacated, its importance lies mostly in its use as a blueprint for future courts
considering issues of free speech in the pharmaceutical industry. In this area, unfortunately, despite its
ultimate ﬁnding on unconstitutionality, WLF I presents a weak case for future pharmaceutical sponsorship
170Id.
171WLF III, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 14-15.
172See id. at 15.
40of CME, for the following reasons. First, it uses the Bolger test of commercial speech in a way that will sweep
too much speech into the commercial category, because of its emphasis on the intent of the manufacturer in
making the determination. Secondly, it is under-inclusive in its eﬀect on CME regulation because it hangs
its unconstitutional ruling on the thin thread of an interest in getting drugs on label, and rejecting the
government interest in protecting physicians for fear that they will misuse it.
1. The Bolger core v. commercial speech issue
Whether the speech was core speech or commercial speech is im-
portant because while the state cannot generally regulate core
speech based on its content, it can regulate commercial speech
based on its content.174 The FDA would have to meet a much
higher bar in order to restrict non-commercial speech. It would
have to show that “the government’s interest in preserving regula-
tory incentives [was] among the most ‘compelling’ of interests – not
merely a ‘substantial’ one.”175 This would necessitate an entirely
diﬀerent analysis than the Central Hudson test actually used.
WLF I highlights the weaknesses of Bolger as a test of commercial speech. The Bolger test has already
been criticized in the scholarly literature because of its vagueness and diﬃculty of application,176 and the
174See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (“In most other contexts, the First Amendment prohibits regulation based on
the content of the message. Two features of commercial speech permit regulation of its contents. First, commercial speakers
have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of
their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the oﬀspring of economic self-
interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.”). (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
175See Smith, supra note 52, at 983.
176See e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt and Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and the Birth of Change in Commercial Speech
Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart, 34 Am. Bus. L.J. 483 (stating that “[Bolger] created uncertainty, however, by noting
that the commercial speech label could be appropriate even if not all of the characteristics were present, and by implying that
the presence of all three characteristics would not always mandate the commercial speech classiﬁcation. Besides being unclear
about how to apply its “test” for what constitutes commercial speech, Bolger arguably created the danger of undervaluing
41Supreme Court has pulled away from its use in later cases.177 The diﬃculties the WLF I court had in using
the test exposes its weaknesses as an appropriate test of commercial speech and can lead to suggestions for
reform.
Even in Bolger, the court was not in agreement on the factors for the test or even that it was a test.178 In a
cryptic footnote, the majority ﬁrst noted that the three-factor test was not deﬁnitive, stating that “[we do
not] mean to suggest that each of the characteristics present in this case must necessarily be present in order
for speech to be commercial. For example, we express no opinion as to whether reference to any particular
product or service is a necessary element of commercial speech.”179
How the Supreme Court came to use these factors in Bolger itself deserves some elaboration. In Bolger,
the speech at issue also concerned a healthcare products manufacturer’s right to engage in scientiﬁc and
commercial speech about its products. Speciﬁcally, Youngs sought to distribute one type of brochure that
advertised the manufacturer’s contraceptives and a second type of brochure that provided information about
venereal disease and the beneﬁts of using contraceptives. The latter did not discuss any of the manufacturer’s
products speciﬁcally in the main text, and were marked with only a small notation of the manufacturer’s
name at the end of the pamphlet: “Youngs, the distributor of Trojan-brand prophylactics.”180 The court
easily found the former to be advertisements but had a more diﬃcult time deciding on the latter because
they appeared to be scientiﬁc and educational speech:
certain expression that should merit more than an intermediate level of protection.”).
177In Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, the next Supreme Court case considering the core/commercial issue, the
Court narrowed its deﬁnition by characterizing the proposal of a commercial transaction as “the test for identifying commercial
speech.” 492 U.S. 469 at 473-474 ((1989). See also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993)
(agreeing with the narrower test of Fox).
178See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, J. concurring; id. at 80 (Stevens, J. concurring).
179Id. at 68.
180Id. at note 4.
42Youngs’ informational pamphlets, however, cannot be characterized merely as proposals to engage in
commercial transactions. Their proper classiﬁcation as commercial or non-commercial speech thus
presents a closer question. The mere fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertisements
clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech....The reference to a speciﬁc
product does not by itself render the pamphlets commercial speech. Finally, the fact that Youngs
has an economic motivation for mailing the pamphlets would clearly be insuﬃcient by itself to turn
the materials into commercial speech.181
However, the court found that “[t]he combination of all these characteristics, however, provide strong support
for the District Court’s conclusion that the informational pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial
speech.”182 Although the facts in this case met the test, the refusal to plainly declare the three factors to
be a test leaves its usefulness as a practical test of commercial speech open to question.
Given that the court did not explain how the test should be used, it presents problems when the facts diﬀer
from those in Bolger. For example, in Bolger, the manufacturer conceded that the informational pamphlets
were advertising.183 The court therefore did not instruct future courts in how to determine if something was
an advertisement if this was not stipulated.
In WLF I, the district court seemed to base its ﬁnding that it was an advertisement on the fact of commercial
motivation, but this interpretation conﬂates the ﬁrst and third factors. On the ﬁrst factor, it determined that
the activity is an advertisement because of the manufacturer’s economic motivation for distributing enduring
materials and sponsoring CME, which is the same as the third factor.184 In addition, unlike Bolger, the
plaintiﬀ did not concede that the activities at issue were advertisements.185 The court instead determined
that it was an advertisement based on the fact that the manufacturer undertakes these activities to “call a
physician’s attention to the subject drug product, show that the drug eﬀectively treats a certain condition
(emphasize a desirable quality) in the hopes that the drug will prescribe (buy or patronize) the drug.”186
182Id. at 67.
183See id. at 66.
184See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
185See id.
186Id.
43This determines the ﬁnding of commercial speech based on the motivation of the speaker, which is the third
factor: “whether the speaker has an economic motivation for disseminating the speech.”187 Because it uses
practically the same analysis for both the ﬁrst and third factors, the Bolger test, as demonstrated by this
court, seemed to base its ﬁnding of commercial speech almost exclusively on motivation.
It weakens the argument that the CME sponsorship was commercial speech if the test is reduced to a two-
factor test, given that the Supreme Court found Bolger a close issue. The Bolger court only decided it was
commercial speech after ﬁnding that it was the “combination of all these characteristics,”188 one of them
being that the manufacturer conceded the pamphlets to be advertising.189 That fact had a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the court. If core and commercial speech are ends of a spectrum with “mixed” speech in the middle,
sponsorship of CME is arguably closer to the core end than the informational pamphlets.
It seems that the Bolger court’s objective was to block advertisers from distributing what they clearly admit
to be advertisements while still enjoying core speech protection “simply by including references to public
issues.”190 “[A]dvertising which ‘links a product to a current public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the
constitutional protection aﬀorded noncommercial speech.”191 Therefore, the more precise holding of Bolger
is that advertising which also mentions public issues cannot be boot-strapped into core speech. However,
it still fails to deﬁne what is advertising, leaving courts which must decide closer questions, like the WLF I
court, without a clear guide.
187Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66, quoted in WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
188Id. at 67. (emphasis original).
189See id. at 66.
190Id. at 68.
191Id., quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
442. The government interest issue
The biggest blow to the FDA’s regulatory scheme was the ﬁnding that the protection of physicians from
oﬀ-label speech was not a legitimate interest. The FDA’s entire approach to CME regulation has been
premised on this concern. The governmental interest in getting drugs on-label has always been a secondary
justiﬁcation in the FDA’s guidance documents.192 As precedent for future decisions to be made about
FDA regulation of scientiﬁc speech, the better method would be to ground the judgment on the interest in
non-misleading speech. Instead, the narrower ground leaves future regulation of scientiﬁc speech far more
vulnerable now that a court has disapproved of the FDA’s interest in protecting the listener from speech. It
casts into doubt the other parts of the CME guidance that do not address oﬀ-label uses, but instead allow
the FDA to regulate on-label speech that is false, misleading, or lacks fair balance.
Although there is strong judicial dislike for bans on information to protect the listener, in my view, the court
erred in striking down the governmental interest in “ensuring that physicians receive accurate and unbiased
information.”193 It did not suﬃciently weigh the government’s interest in ensuring that accurate information
about drugs is given to doctors. The court simply concludes, without support, that trained physicians are
“certainly capable of critically evaluating journal articles or textbook reprints that are mailed to them, or
the ﬁndings presented at CME seminars.”194 However, the court did not adequately consider the nature
of the information at issue. Studies on the nature of information have shown that scientiﬁc information
is the least conducive to easy evaluation. 195 Although it is true that physicians must evaluate scientiﬁc
information when they read scientiﬁc journals, journals already have a built-in screening mechanism through
192The Final CME Guidance discusses the protection justiﬁcation in far more detail than the on-label interest. See Final
CME Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,080.
193Friediman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
194Id. at 70.
195See Noah, supra note 89, at 379.
45the peer-review system.196 CME have no such screening mechanism, therefore the danger that undetectable,
misleading information will be presented should have been given more weight. Thus, when in fact the
pharmaceutical manufacturers are using CME for promotional purposes,197 the FDA should be able to
ensure that it is truthful, non-misleading and fairly balanced.
This does not mean that I disagree with the court’s ruling that the ban of speech about oﬀ-label uses is
unconstitutional. I agree with the court that this regulation is not narrowly tailored to either the interest in
accurate and unbiased information or the interest in getting drugs on-label. The interests that this regulation
serves can be taken care of by disclaimers as the WLF I court noted. “Full disclosure not only addresses all of
the concerns advanced by the FDA, but addresses them more eﬀectively. It is less restrictive on speech, while
at the same time deals more precisely with concerns of the FDA and Congress.”198 But without aﬃrming
the interest in accurate and unbiased information, the second eﬀect of the guidance – the regulation of the
presentation of on-label uses – is left in doubt, as this relies solely on an interest in protecting doctors. The
regulation of content is one that can pass constitutional muster, given that the same regulations are already
applied to other forms of advertising and labeling. Courts have looked more favorably on content regulation
than on ﬂat bans on speech.
In addition, there is no substitute for this interest in regulation. In contrast, there are already adequate
incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers to get uses on label. Many insurance plans will only reimburse
for on-label prescriptions.199 Speech at CME is also a very narrow forum for discussion of oﬀ-label uses;
196A peer review system is the editorial screening process by which medical journals evaluate articles submitted for publication.
In the system, experts in the ﬁeld evaluate submitted articles before they are approved for publication. See id. at 379-402.
197This issue, when speakers are actually representing the pharmaceutical manufacturer, thus making their speech promotional,
will be discussion in depth in Part IV, infra.
198See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 73. The standard that disclosure requirements must meet to regulate speech is lower than
the standard that bans on speech must meet. The Supreme Court has applied a three-part test: 1) the disclosure requirements
are reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing deception of consumers, and 2) there is no problem of vagueness and
3) they are not “unjustiﬁed or unduly burdensome.” See Zauderer v. Oﬃce of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
199See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2000) (Medicare does not cover treatments which are “not reasonable and necessary.”).
This is often interpreted to mean exclude treatments which have not been judged safe and eﬀective by the FDA, i.e., an oﬀ-label
46pharmaceutical manufacturers must still get uses on-label if they want to engage in more traditional ad-
vertising, such as print and television advertising, or to use their sales force to promote the use.200 These
methods reach a far broader audience than CME. Lastly, FDA approval is still a factor in tort liability for
pharmaceutical manufacturers and physicians. For manufacturers, FDA approval can sometimes provide a
defense to product liability actions.201 Conversely, overpromotion of drugs that dilute otherwise adequate
warnings can give rise to liability.202 For physicians, prescribing oﬀ-label involves a higher risk of medical
malpractice because the FDA-approved use can be evidence of the appropriate standard of care.203 Although
physicians will not be liable if the oﬀ-label use comports with the currently accepted medical practice in
the community or reliable medical research, the threat of liability means that physicians will not take a
manufacturer’s word about the safety and eﬃcacy of oﬀ-label use at face value, but instead will check that it
is backed up by other reliable evidence. Therefore a manufacturer will always have more physician support
for their on-label uses of products, when physicians no longer have to worry about whether an oﬀ-label use
comports with currently accepted medical practice. These incentives to get new uses on-label still exist when
speech about oﬀ-label uses at CME is allowed.
use.
200WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
201See Richard C. Ashcroft, The Impact of the Washington Legal Foundation Cases on Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Practices
in the United States, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 95, 109 (2000) (noting that several states have enacted statutes that bar punitive damages
when the manufacturer has complied with FDA regulations in bringing a product to market, including complying with packaging
and labeling provisions. FDA approval is a factor considered by other jurisdictions that do not have a statutory defense.).
202See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6d (1997) (manufacturers have a duty to warn prescribers); Stevens
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973) (“Although the manufacturer or supplier of a prescription drug has a
duty to adequately warn the medical profession of its dangerous properties or of facts which make it likely to be dangerous,
an adequate warning to the profession may be eroded or even nulliﬁed by overpromotion of the drug through a vigorous sales
program which may have the eﬀect of persuading the prescribing doctor to disregard the warnings given.”).
203See e.g., Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 135 (Utah 1989) (holding that package inserts are one of several factors for
consideration of whether the physician used the appropriate standard of care).
47IV. Analysis: First Amendment Issues
In my view, neither the guidance document nor the WLF I decision is entirely correct because the entire
scheme to regulate CME set out in the guidance document (and not contested in the WLF cases) does
not conform to current First Amendment law governing speech. Speciﬁcally, the line the FDA drew to
determine what was promotional and what was not does not conform to current First Amendment law on
speech attribution because CME speakers do not always speak for the sponsoring pharmaceutical company
and therefore their independent speech is not subject to regulation by the FDA. For this reason, the guidance
document is over-inclusive in its classiﬁcation of speech subject to regulation.
The issue of speech attribution, or representation, was not raised by either party or the court. All parties
accepted without question the FDA’s assertion that these 12 factors delineated promotional speech from
non-promotional speech. But because the “speech” of the pharmaceutical company is expressed through
ﬁnancial sponsorship, one question that must be asked is “who is the speaker?”. This is always a question
where there is more than one potential speaker, a situation that is becoming more and more prevalent as
institutions are “speaking” more and more often.
There may have been [...] a time when institutions did not often speak; when technology was less
pervasive; when the question “who is the speaker?” seemed to be, and usually was, redundant; and
when the question, “Is there a speaker?” seemed facetious. But that was another era for the First
Amendment. Now much, if not most speech is institutional. Money and speech have become deeply
intertwined because the medium of speech has become as central to its force as the message.204
The WLF I court assumed that the CME speaker spoke for the sponsoring pharmaceutical manufacturer.
The court’s assumption is clear from its statements when it decided whether the speech was conduct, com-
mercial speech or core speech. First, it said “[the] sponsorship of CME seminars addressing and encouraging
48that conduct is speech.”205 It goes on to say “the activities at issue are only ‘conduct’ to the extent that
moving one’s lips is ‘conduct.”’206 Thus it seems that in the court’s thinking, the two form parts of the same
activity.
The WLF I court was simply picking up the FDA’s own assumption when it devised the CME guidance
document. The guidance states that:
the “intended use” of a drug or device refers to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible
for the labeling of the product. This intent is determined by labeling claims, advertising matter, or
oral or written statements by such persons or their representatives.207
Speakers at CME are not necessarily representatives of the pharmaceutical manufacturers. Indeed, many
CME speakers – almost always unaﬃliated doctors and researchers –would be surprised to ﬁnd themselves
representatives of the pharmaceutical company, according to the FDA, simply because they happen to accept
a speaking engagement that a company funds. This forms the ground for several commentators’ unease at
the regulation of CME; it seems counterintuitive to accept that a speaker at a CME seminar run by an
independent CME provider should suddenly be positioned as the speaker for the pharmaceutical company
because the pharmaceutical company has provided funding or suggested him as a potential presenter for the
seminar.208
Attribution of speech makes more sense when considered in the context of the company distributing reprints
of scientiﬁc articles; in that situation, the company has chosen to distribute that already-written, speciﬁc
205WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 59.
206Id.
208In this section, when I consider CME activities that the guidance considers as factors of promotion (and therefore repre-
sentation), I will use the example of when a pharmaceutical manufacturer suggests a speaker to a CME provider. Of course
there are other activities included in the 12 factors and arguably this are most mild of any of them, but I choose the mildest in
order to show how the guidance is over-inclusive in sweeping these things in. In Part B, I will look at more of the factors and
try to establish which ones count as “representative speech” and which do not.
49article and adopted the speech within it. But in the CME context, in many cases, the speaker enjoys a
degree of autonomy from the sponsoring company; he or she, not the company, has ultimate control over
the content of the speech. Although there could be situations where the pharmaceutical company sponsor
is so involved in directing the CME conference that it does dictate exactly what the speaker says, the CME
regulations at issue also sweep in situations where the pharmaceutical company merely suggests speakers or
topics for presentation. In these situations, the connection between the speaker and the funding company
is too tenuous to consider the speaker to be speaking for the pharmaceutical company. The fact that the
manufacturer provided the means for the CME speaker to speak is not dispositive of representation; “sub-
sidization is only one factor that must be considered when making judgments about the characterization of
speech.”209
This issue is a priori to any consideration of the FDA’s regulation of CME. While it can regulate what phar-
maceutical companies say, it cannot regulate what independent third parties say; thus if the speech cannot
be attributed to the pharmaceutical company, the FDA has no authority to regulate it.210 Because the line
that the CME guidance document draws is over-inclusive in terms of the speech that can be attributed to
the sponsoring pharmaceutical manufacturer, it thus results in restriction of some core as well as commercial
speech. For example, if a pharmaceutical company suggests speakers or content, the speech presented at
the CME will have to comply with the advertising, labeling and promotional regulations applicable only
to pharmaceutical companies –regulations banning oﬀ-label speech, and comparative claims and claims not
presenting the drugs with an FDA-approved “fair balance” of information.211 This restricts the speech of
independent, third-party speakers – the CME speakers – who must now comply with even though they do
not represent the pharmaceutical company.
209See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151,154 (1996).
210See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (“FDA has no objection to...distribution [of speech] from any source other than the drug
manufacturer.) (emphasis original). See also Kessler and Pines, supra note 21, at 2401-11 (“A person with no ties to a drug
manufacturer can say anything he or she wants about a drug, it is neither labeling nor advertising.”).
211See Draft CME Guidance, 57 Fed. Reg. at 56,413 n.1.
50Even if the FDA did try to assert authority to regulate the speech of persons other than the pharmaceutical
manufacturers, an addition consequence if the speech is not attributable is that the speech would remain
core, rather than commercial speech, necessitating a diﬀerent regulatory analysis.212 This fact was acknowl-
edged by the WLF I court when it stated that “[i]t is beyond dispute that when considered outside of the
manufacturer promotion of their drug products, CME seminars...merit the highest degree of constitutional
protection....[residing] at the core of the First Amendment.”213 The FDA would have to meet a much
higher bar in order to restrict non-commercial speech: “the government’s interest in preserving regulatory
incentives would have to be shown to be among the most ‘compelling’ of interests – not merely a ‘substantial’
one.”214
It is also problematic because the guidance document is a guide to enforcement. Basing its enforcement
decisions on 12 factors in this document, the FDA would be using its enforcement power against the phar-
maceutical company based on the speech of an (in my view) independent third party. Liability arises from
the CME speaker’s speech; but it is not necessary, according to the guidance document, that the pharma-
ceutical manufacturer have control over the speech.215 However, the pharmaceutical manufacturer played
its part before the CME seminar occurs when it decided to fund and perhaps suggested speakers or content.
If that was all that the manufacturer did, it had no editorial control over what the CME speaker said and
no other part in the planning by the independent CME provider. Therefore, the pharmaceutical company
would be responsible for speech it exercised no control over.
Thus the question of who is the speaker is of the greatest importance. The constitutional speech issues that
must be considered are:
212See Post, supra note 209, at 154 (“[S]ubstantive First Amendment analysis will depend on whether the citizen who speaks
is characterized as a [...] functionary or as an independent participant in public discourse.”).
213WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
214See Smith, supra note 52, at 983.
215See Final CME Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074.
511)
Can the speech of CME speaker always be attributed to the sponsoring pharmaceutical
manufacturer based on the 12 factors used in the CME Guidance? In other words, is the CME
speaker necessarily the representational speaker for the pharmaceutical manufacturer?
2)
If the 12 factors do not delineate the appropriate line to deﬁne representational
speech, what factors should be used?
The answers will establish the line between core and commercial speech. It will also establish
when the pharmaceutical company is responsible for the speech of speakers at the CME
conference.
A. Sponsorship as speech: theory and cases
1. Representational speech theory
Attribution is a diﬃcult question, particularly because corporate speech216 is necessarily ac-
complished by the speech of individuals associated with it – its employees and agents. “Attribu-
tion is, almost by deﬁnition, an uncontrollable phenomenon, since it is a product of third party
observers and interpreters of events in speciﬁc context.”217 The fact that the pharmaceutical
216Speech by corporations is protected by the First Amendment. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
217See Bezanson and Buss, supra note 19, 1484.
52company’s speech is speech accomplished by funding218 and by editorial decision-making,219
while also recognized as speech protected by the First Amendment, presents another layer of
complexity.
Randall Bezanson has written about concepts of “representational speech” in the area of
institutional (including corporate) speech.220 “Representational speech is speech that does
not represent the speaker’s free communicative will but instead represents the speech of an-
other.”221 Some ways that representative speech can happen is “when the content of a person’s
speech is dictated by another, perhaps through coercion or payment, or the voluntary choice
of a speaker to express the views of another as an agent.”222 According to Professor Bezanson,
the question of when a speaker speaks for himself or another is determined by “whether the
speech was an intentional and voluntary act expressing the speaker’s own beliefs and com-
municative free will.”223 This is particularly important as commercial speech becomes more
prevalent:
In the commercial speech setting, the representational speech concept has particular relevance to the
“oﬃcial capacity” question...– the relationship between the formal capacity in which one speaks and
the ‘ownership’ of the views one is expressing for purposes of the First Amendment...The question
in the corporate speech setting, therefore is, “Who is the speaker speaking for?” The answer to
the question should depend not on the post hoc claim of the speaker, but rather, as in Rust v.
Sullivan224 on the formal capacity in which the speaker claims to speak or is reasonably understood
to speak. For purposes of the First Amendment liberty to speak, it is the speaker’s own ideas and
communicative free will that count.225
This view is supported by speech jurisprudence. Although there is no case law exactly on point to the
218See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (holding that the act of ﬁnancial contribution involved a limited element of
protected speech). See also Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 491-92 (2000) (The First Amendment
“may also be implicated in the use of money” as well as in speaking itself.).
219Editorial decision-making is also considered a kind of speech protected by the First Amendment. See Miami Herald Publ’g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
220See Bezanson, supra note 204.
221See id. at 766.
222Id.
223Id.
53CME sponsorship issue, there are similar cases in the areas of campaign contributions and government-
subsidized speech. The common factor between these cases and the CME situation is that the court must
determine under what circumstances the speech of an otherwise independent speaker can be attributed
to the ﬁnancial sponsor. Generally, although the Supreme Court has not articulated a general test for
when speech is representational, their analysis generally holds that speech is only attributable to a ﬁnancial
sponsor when the sponsor has such editorial control over the speech that it displaces the speaker’s “own ideas
and communicative free will.”226 In those situations, the speaker is thus speaking for the sponsor because
the sponsor has control over the content. Because the 12 factors in the CME guidance do not necessarily
implicate editorial control, the CME guidance sweeps in more speech than can properly be attributed to the
ﬁnancial sponsor.
2. Campaign ﬁnance cases
The most similar cases are the campaign ﬁnance cases.227 These also concern representational
speech and deal with the ambiguity in whether the speech of a political candidate or a political
action committee (PAC) can be said to represent the speech of the contributor. CME funding
cases are very similar. Instead of funding political speech, the pharmaceutical manufacturers
are funding scientiﬁc speech.228 In the CME context, the speech is expressed through the act of
funding plus the suggestion of content. In these acts, the pharmaceutical manufacturer sponsor
chooses from among diﬀerent candidates, which indicates a preference for the candidate’s
226See campaign ﬁnance cases, infra Part IV.A.2 and subsidized speech cases, infra Part IV.A.3. See also Southworth v.
Grebe, 157 F.3d 1124, 1140 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that “speech rights are implicated only where their interest allows [a
ﬁnancial investor] to exercise editorial control, in which case attribution would be proper”).
227See e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1, Cal. Med. Assoc. v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) [hereinafter “CMA”].
228Although the court ﬁnds that ﬁnancial contributions are speech when they are used to fund political speech, I ﬁnd no logical
reason that contributions to scientiﬁc speech should not similarly be speech, given that political and scientiﬁc speech are both
at the core of the First Amendment. See note 124, supra.
54views, character, and other attributes. Funding CME generally is not enough if it does not also
include any editorial preference of content or speaker. In such a case, it is just a contribution
to education and implies no narrower preference. It would be equivalent to giving money to
a general candidate fund.
When a company suggests speakers or content, its action is equivalent to when an organization
chooses to fund a certain candidate or PAC – it is a contribution based on sympathy of interests.
It seems reasonable to say that the pharmaceutical manufacturer is interested in disseminating
information on that particular topic or that it supports the views of that particular speaker.229
It may even choose that speaker because it believes that he will give a favorable presentation
of its products. But sympathy of interests is not enough to make the CME speaker the
mouthpiece for the pharmaceutical manufacturer, as the next cases will show.
The original campaign ﬁnance case in which the Court articulated its view of campaign ﬁnance as speech is
Buckley v. Valeo.230 In Buckley, the limitations on campaign contributions were challenged on the ground
that they limited the ability of the contributor to express his political views through the speech of another.
The Court in that case dismissed the “representational speech” claim in that case, stating: “While con-
tributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or association to present views to the
voters, the transformations of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor.”231 The Supreme Court declined to say that the interests of a candidate and a contributor were
so intertwined that the candidate can be said to speak for the contributor. This is because of the vague
nature of contribution. It “serves as a general expression of support for a candidate and his views, but does
229See e.g., Holmer, supra note 100 (describing some of the reasons why pharmaceutical manufacturers sponsor CME).
230424 U.S 1.
231Id. at 21. (emphasis added).
55not communicate the underlying basis for the support.”232 The act of contributing is an “undiﬀerentiated,
symbolic act.” 233
The Supreme Court’s view on representational speech in campaign ﬁnance was further detailed in California
Medical Association (CMA) v. Federal Election Commission.234 In this case, the CMA alleged that CAL-
PAC, a PAC it funded, spoke for it and so its contributions to CALPAC should not be limited because it
would restrict CMA’s speech. The court rejected this argument, ﬁnding no connection close enough between
the two groups to make CALPAC’s speech also CMA’s by “speech by proxy”235: “CALPAC instead is a
separate legal entity that receives funds from multiple sources and that engages in independent political
advocacy. Of course, CMA would probably not contribute to CALPAC unless it agreed with the views
espoused by CALPAC, but this sympathy of interests alone does not convert CALPAC’s speech into that of
the CMA.”236
The analysis in this case relevant to CME is the proposition that “sympathy of interests” alone is insuﬃcient
to make speech representational. This aﬀects the FDA’s assumption that the pharmaceutical manufacturer
is sponsoring the speech because it, in some degree, agrees with the speech and wants to encourage its
dissemination. The pharmaceutical manufacturer could even desire to disseminate the speech because the
speaker views its products favorably and will promote its oﬀ-label uses. But under the court’s analysis in
CMA, this “sympathy of interests”, without additional connection between the speaker and pharmaceutical
manufacturer, is not enough to make the CME speaker the “mouthpiece” for the pharmaceutical manufac-
turer. Campaign contributions fail the test of representation because “it is often diﬃcult if not impossible
to trace the resultant speech to the purposeful and free decision of the donor to express his or her own views
232Id.
233Id.
234CMA, 453 U.S. 182.
235Id. at 196.
236Id.
56by the contribution.”237 That is, although they might share similar views, their views are not one and the
same. Thus, each idea expressed by the speaker cannot be automatically attributed to the pharmaceutical
manufacturer sponsor as well. To regulate speech at CME, the FDA would need this sort of identity of
speech because CME enforcement action would be very speech speciﬁc. The FDA would have to prove a
violation by reference to speciﬁc sentences and words that stated the oﬀ-label use or misleading characteri-
zation. Identity between the CME speaker and the sponsoring company will not normally be located at this
level of speciﬁcity.
3. Subsidized speech cases
Of course, the biggest diﬀerence between campaign ﬁnance and CME sponsorship is that a pharmaceutical
manufacturer is the sole contributor. The Supreme Court found it relevant in its non-speech analysis that
campaign contributors were only one of many supporters of the candidates or PACs.238 It could be argued
that, in the CME context, the CME speaker does speak for the sole sponsor, it is more likely to be aware
and take account of its sponsor’s views. For this argument, the subsidized speech cases are illuminative.
Government subsidization cases are similar to CME cases in their consideration of the question: if an entity
(whether it be the government or a private corporation) pays money to fund speech, can the speaker be
said to speak for the ﬁnancial sponsor? As First Amendment scholar Robert C. Post put it: “Subsidized
speech challenges two fundamental assumptions of ordinary First Amendment doctrine. It renders uncertain
the status of speakers, forcing us to determine whether speakers should be characterized as independent
237See Bezanson, supra note 204, at 777.
238See CMA, 453 U.S. at 196 (“CALPAC instead is a separate legal entity that receives funds from multiple sources and that
engages in independent political advocacy.”).
57participants in the formation of public opinion or instead as instrumentalities of the government.”239
In government-subsidized speech, the government funds certain activities and places conditions on what their
recipients can say. The government can play many roles, and whether it “speaks” in a certain situation is
a contextual issue: “Does [the government] speak when it acts as a distributor of funds? .... As a sponsor
of research, a tenure committee, or a speakers’ committee?”240 Indeed, in certain cases, the government
can play similar sponsorship roles. The only diﬀerence is that the government is a public sponsor, and
CME speech involves a private sponsor. In determining conditions on speech in these cases, the court must
determine whether the speaker represents the government (in which case it can constrain the speaker’s
speech) or whether the speaker remains independent (in which case it cannot).
Rust v. Sullivan is one of the most signiﬁcant cases on subsidized speech, where the Supreme Court passed
on the question of “who is the speaker.”241 Rust concerned federal funding for family-planning services under
Title X of the Public Health Service Act.242 The family-planning clinics were not operated by government
employees, but by independent contractors, normally private health-care organizations. Part of the Act
expressly provided that the funds may not be used to “provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as
a method of family planning or provide referrals for abortion as a method of family planning,”243 and may
not engage in activities that “encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning.”244
Recipients of federal funds were not prohibited from engaging in abortion-supporting activities, but any such
activities were required to be “physically and ﬁnancially separate” from the Title X projects. In addition,
recipients of Title X funds were expressly directed that one approved response to a question about abortion
239See Post, supra note 209, at 152.
240Bezanson, supra note 204, at 1383.
241500 U.S. 173 (1991).
242Id. at 177.
24342 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989).
24442 C.F.R. § 59.10(a).
58was that a Title X project “does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning.”245
The prohibition on abortion counsel and the direction to withhold information about abortions
was claimed violate the freedom of speech rights of the Title X personnel and of the women
obtaining services from Title X clinics.246 It was argued that the prohibitions discriminated
against the pro-abortion point of view in violation of the First Amendment.247 However, the
Court found that this regulation constitutional because it determined that the doctors were
speaking for the government and the government, when it spoke, was allowed to favor one viewpoint over
another.248 While employed by the government, they were expressing the government’s ideas, and so the
restrictions “[did] not in any way restrict the activities of those persons acting as private individuals.”249
In a similar situation, the FDA should be able to regulate speech when the CME speaker
speaks for the manufacturer. However, there are situations covered within the CME guidance
document where the speaker is expressing ideas of her own communicative free will; these
should have the highest First Amendment scrutiny.
Rust has come to stand for the proposition that “for purposes of the First Amendment, ...that even when
individuals speak, their act of speaking is not protected by the First Amendment unless the ideas they
express are the product of their own communicative free will.”250 In Rust, the court found that the speaker
was the government, not the individual. Because there were no individual speech rights implicated, the
speech could be regulated.
24542 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5).
246Rust, 500 U.S. at 181.
247Id.
248Id. at 198-99 (“The regulations, which govern solely the scope of the Title X project’s activities, do not in any way restrict
the activities of those persons acting as private individuals. The employees’ freedom of expression is limited during the time
that they actually work for the project; but this limitation is a consequence of their decision to accept employment in a project,
the scope of which is permissibly restricted by the funding authority.”).
249Id.
250Bezanson, supra note 204, at 767.
59The Court elaborated further on the subsidized speech question when it decided Legal Services Corporation
v. Velazquez.251 This case concerned the Legal Services Corporation (LSC)’s receipt of federal
money for the legal representation of indigent persons. Congress enacted a statute that pro-
hibited LSC representation in cases that “involve an eﬀort to amend or otherwise challenge
existing law in eﬀect on the date of the initiation of the representation” – meant to address
concerns that federal funds would be used to litigate welfare reform issues.252 This statute was
challenged on the ground that it violated free speech rights.253
Distinguishing the case from Rust v. Sullivan, the Court found that the statute did infringe the rights of
lawyers to speak and the clients to receive their speech.254 The Velazquez Court distinguished the case
from Rust on a factual ﬁnding of whom the speaker represented. It found that in Rust, the “counseling
activities of the doctors... amounted to governmental speech” and thus the government could restrict the
speech to its favored viewpoint.255 In contrast, it found that the LSC program was designed “to facilitate
private speech, not to promote a governmental message.”256 That is, the court said that an LSC-funded
lawyer “speaks on the behalf of the client,” and “is not the government’s speaker.” It determined this based
on the characteristics of a lawyer – a lawyer’s duty to is to speak for his client. The court clearly felt
some discomfort in allowing a restriction on speech by the government that would interfere with a lawyer’s
traditional relationship to his client. In addition, the adversarial nature of legal advocacy made it clear that it
could not be government speech; an LSC-funded lawyer had to speak for his client because the government’s
message would be conveyed by the prosecutor or government lawyer opposing him.257 The fact that the
251531 U.S. 533 (2001).
252Id. at 538.
253Id. at 536-37.
254Id. at 537.
255Id.
256Id. at 542.
257Id.
60government regulation would have “distorted [the speech’s] usual functioning” was another indication that
the speech was of a “private nature.”258 Based on the characteristics of the speaker and the fact that the
control would have distorted the speech’s usual function, the Court found that the government subsidization
funded private speech.
The Court worked very hard to distinguish the case from Rust, as the principles articulated here would seem
to apply to Rust as well. The restrictions in Rust apply to restrict doctors’ professional judgment and advice
in the same way that the Velazquez restriction restricted lawyers’ professional judgments. Rust has been
criticized for that reason, and many commentators still feel that Rust and Velazquez are irreconcilable.259
However, given that Velazquez is the more recent case, it is the better indicator of the Court’s current
position on representational speech.
B. A new standard for the CME Guidance
These cases demonstrate that whether speech is representational is “a very speciﬁc, context-bound judg-
ment.”260 It depends on analysis into the exact circumstances at issue: the relationship between the sponsor
and its fund recipient, the relationship between the fund recipient and the audience for its speech, and the
norms generally associated with the role of the fund recipient. Because of this, it is diﬃcult to devise clear
258Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543 (“The private nature of the speech involved here, and the extent of LSC’s regulation of private
expression, are indicated further by the circumstance that the Government seeks to use an existing medium of expression and
to control it, in a class of cases, in ways which distort its usual functioning.”).
259See e.g., Jessica Russak Sharpe, Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez: Tightening the Noose on Patients’ Rights, 81 N.C. L.
Rev. 1312 (2003).
260See Post, supra note 209, at 156.
61rules for classifying speech as representational.
Nonetheless, a few principles can be derived from these cases. First, from the campaign ﬁnance cases, “sym-
pathy of interests” is not suﬃcient to make the speech representational. Some causal relationship between
the funding and the speech is required. In CME, the fact that a pharmaceutical manufacturer favors a certain
speaker because his views are in line with the manufacturers, and the fact that the manufacturer suggests him
to speak at a particular seminar, without more, is not suﬃcient to make the speaker’s speech representative
of the sponsoring manufacturer. However, the speech could be representational if the manufacturer not only
favors a certain speaker, but a certain presentation as well, based on the adoption theory of representation.
For example, if the CME speaker had a “canned” presentation that he regularly used, and the pharmaceu-
tical company, knowing this, asked him to give this presentation at its CME, the pharmaceutical company
can be considered to have adopted the speech of the speaker, because it knew of and approved of the speech
beforehand. This is similar to why the speech in reprints of articles can be attributed back to the company.
The company and the speaker are at a more speciﬁc level of identiﬁcation; the pharmaceutical company has
pre-approved the speech and thus established a traceable connection between it and the resulting speech.261
But this is clearly a very contextual determination to be made on a case-by-case-basis.
Second, whether a speech is representational can also be examined on whether the sponsor’s conditions
interfere with the speech’s “usual functioning.”262 This is a corollary of the idea that a non-representative
speaker must speak for himself – based on his “general ideas and own free will.” This is determined on
a factual basis, whether the manufacturer has aﬀected the speech, not the speaker. For example, I would
not classify the manufacturer’s suggestion of a speaker as an interference with a speaker’s usual functioning
– which at CME is to “oﬀer expert teaching and best evidence information.”263 In the CME situation,
261See Bezanson comment, supra note 237.
262Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
263See Coyle, supra note 65, at 403. See also ACCME Standards for Commercial Support of Continuing Medical Education,
62the speaker often still has control of the views he presents and is free to decide what his views are based
on his expert opinion of the evidence. However, I would characterize a manufacturer’s attempt to control
the content (by scripting the speech or providing ﬁnal editing of the speech) to be an interference with the
speaker’s usual functioning because it interferes with a speaker’s ability to fulﬁll his function, much as the
restrictions in Velazquez interfered with a lawyer’s function.
Thus, I believe that all the factors considered in the guidance document264 should be factors that address the
issue of whether the speaker was speaking from his “own beliefs and communicative free will.”265 The focus
of the document should be on the relationship between the CME speaker and the manufacturer, the ﬁrst
factor – “control of content and selection of presenters and moderators” – listed in the guidance. The other
factors, such as whether the audience was chosen from sales and marketing lists, are irrelevant if the CME
speaker did not transmit the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s promotional message. These factors should be
considered by the FDA perhaps as warning signs suggesting a need for further investigation, but should not
be considered as evidence of promotion.
available at http://www.accme.org/accreditation/sec acc sta.asp (last visited March 29, 2003) (“The purpose of continuing
medical education (CME) is to enhance the physician’s ability to care for patients. It is the responsibility of the accredited
provider of a CME activity to assure that the activity is designed primarily for that purpose.”).
264Again, the 12 factors for consideration are:
1) control of content and selection of presenters and moderators
2) disclosures
3) focus of the program
4) relationship between provider and supporting company
5) providers involvement in sales or marketing
6) provider’s demonstrated failure to meet standards
7) multiple presentations
8) audience selection
9) opportunities for discussion
10) dissemination
11) ancillary promotional activities
12) complaints.
Final CME Guidance, 64 Fed Reg. 64,074.. The guidance also notes that this is not an exhaustive list; “other factors may
be appropriate for consideration in a particular case.” Id.
265Bezanson, supra note 204, at 793.
63The line that I propose still allows for FDA regulation of speech that is made on behalf of the pharmaceutical
company. Other commentators take a more extreme view: that speaker-based distinctions should not be
made at all.266 For example, Glenn C. Smith argues that to do so would be to “transmogrify” scientiﬁc
speech into commercial speech, simply because the speaker is the pharmaceutical company rather than an
independent scientist.267 In his view, this makes an arbitrary distinction between speakers even if the speech
is exactly the same.
The problem is when commercial speech and non-commercial speech is indistinguishable in content.
The line that the FDA draws is what the motivation behind the speech is, or who the speaker is.
As one commentator put it, the regulation seems ill-ﬁtting because “given the initial fully-protected
status of oﬀ-label research, it seems unnatural that the same scientiﬁc work delivered to the same
audience without any change of content should undergo a fundamental status change and default to
lesser protection just because one additional speaker (the drug’s manufacturer) disseminates it.268
Indeed, some courts have at times expressed a distaste for regulating speech based on the identify of the
speaker, noting that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does
not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”269
However, in the CME context, this view fails to take into account the changed inherent nature of the speech
when promotion is injected into the speech’s creation. As one CME provider put it, “there [is] a diﬀerence
between commercial speech and educational speech, and this boundary is worth protecting.”270 The com-
266This was the position taken by the WLF during the WLF I litigation. See WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (“Plaintiﬀ clams
that because this speech merits full protection when uttered by a scientist or academic, the level of constitutional scrutiny
should not change merely because a corporation wishes to enhance the distribution of that message.”) See also Pﬁzer First
Amendment Comments, supra note 87, at 110-111 (“FDA’s current regulations single out drug manufacturers as the only
class of speakers who cannot join freely in this public debate. Instead, manufacturers are governed by ‘pervasive, extensive
regulations that tightly control what manufacturers may say about their products and attempt to transmogrify advertising and
other promotional communications into comprehensive instructional messages.”); Scott Bass et al., Oﬀ-Label Promotion: Is
FDA’s Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and Educational Programs Enforceable?, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 193,
202 (1998).
267See Smith, supra note 52, at 966; Bass, supra note 266, at 202 (noting that “[t]he content of an independent, non-
promotional program might be identical to one inﬂuenced or sought to be inﬂuenced by a manufacturer, yet FDA recognizes
that it has no regulatory authority whatsoever over the former type of activity. Thus the net eﬀect of FDA’s rules, if upheld,
would be to prevent a particular class of speakers from expressing ideas that the agency itself acknowledges are beyond the
scope of its regulatory power.”).
269Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777..
270See Skolnick, supra note 40.
64mentators and the courts suppose the existence of a seminar prior to the involvement of the manufacturer
sponsor. While this must be true of reprints of scientiﬁc articles already published in a peer-reviewed journal
before it came into the hands of the pharmaceutical manufacturers, the same cannot necessarily be said of
CME. CME seminars are usually not ready-made before sponsoring company enters into the picture; it is
speech that will always occur after the decision to sponsor is made.271 Therefore, one can never guarantee
that the CME will be the “same scientiﬁc work delivered to the same audience without any change of con-
tent”272 whether the CME sponsor was involved or not. Given the complexity of scientiﬁc speech, whether
promotional inﬂuence had an eﬀect or not will be diﬃcult to discern.273 The CME sponsor can always
potentially control the speech. If it interferes to control the content of the speech, the FDA should be able
to regulate the speech.
On the other hand, it could be argued that focusing only on actual editorial control will still allow some
speech that has been inﬂuenced by the pharmaceutical industry. The FDA took this position in the Fi-
nal CME Guidance.274 In its response to comments, the FDA rejected suggestions from commentators who
“contended that the correct inquiry is whether a company has actually inﬂuenced a presentation,” and main-
tained its position that “the agency will examine whether and to what extent the company ‘is in a position
to inﬂuence’ the presentation.275 But problems of proof are not reason enough to sweep in activity that
legally, according to principles derived from existing case law, cannot be attributed to the pharmaceutical
company. When an entity is being held responsible, both civilly and criminally,276 for speech, it must be
proven that it was its ideas and will behind the speech. The possibility of inﬂuence is not suﬃcient. Given
the high value the Constitution and the courts put on scientiﬁc speech, it is better to leave out some speech
271This excepts of course, where there is a canned speech that the pharmaceutical company agrees to fund. In that case, the
pharmaceutical company will have adopted the speech and it would be subject to regulation as discussed above.
272See Smith, supra note 52, at 966.
273See discussion of the nature of scientiﬁc speech, supra, Part II.D.3.
274See 64 Fed. Reg. at 64,083.
275Id.
276The FDA has the power to enforce violations of acts under its jurisdiction criminally as well as civilly. See 21 U.SC. §
352(f).
65than to include too much.
66V. Conclusion
Some might say that the exact line that the CME guidance draws does not matter because the FDA will
not enforce minor violations and we can trust in the FDA for a more common sense determination of what
is promotional. The FDA has admitted that it will use discretion in enforcing the CME Guidance.277 But if
that is true, if the guidance is not a reﬂection of what the FDA will do, then it is no guidance at all. Given
the consequences, this leaves pharmaceutical manufacturers in a state of uncertainty and chills their speech.
If the FDA intends for its policies to comply with First Amendment law, as it claims in its request for
comments, it should revise the factors to reﬂect First Amendment law, thus ensuring that valuable scientiﬁc
speech is maximized.
This will not be the last time that the FDA will have to deal with First Amendment issues in formulating
its policies and regulations. The FDA has a unique regulatory jurisdiction in that it occupies an area that
concerns the commercial side of science and medicine. That means it will often ﬁnd itself straddling the
core/commercial speech line. In addition, as corporate speech becomes more common and as corporations
increasingly assert their rights to speak, the FDA will particularly have to deal with more complex speech
issues involving multiple speakers and speech by entities instead of individuals, as this example demonstrates.
As corporations become more creative in using media, the FDA will have to deal with various new modes
of speech, such as speech on the Internet, speech by virtual press releases, and speech by sponsorship in
various conﬁgurations. In order to fulﬁll its regulatory goals of protecting the public health and further
the development of life-saving new drugs, the FDA must develop a clear First Amendment compliance that
277In a letter to WLF responding to its citizen petition, the FDA stated that “[b]ecause the FDA must choose carefully where
to deploy its limited resources, FDA is unlikely to initiate an enforcement action where the only evidence of an unapproved use
is the distribution of enduring materials or sponsorship of CME” quoted in Drug Makers Struggle With Evolving FDA Oﬀ-Label
Policy, Food and Drug Letter, Mar. 15, 2002.
67comports with representational speech doctrine in order to establish a workable division between commercial
speech that it can regulate and core speech it cannot.
68